BX 9178 
.W45N5 





* ■ 




NINE SERMONS 



ON* TUB 



DECREES AND AGENCY 

OF GOD. 



BY WILLIAM R. WEEKS, D. D, 



THIRD EDITION, 



NEWARK, N. J. 

PUBLISHED BY THE ECCLESIASTICAL BOARD OF 
TRUSTEES FOR THE PROPAGATION 
OF THE GOSPEL. 
John R. Weeks, Primer. 

1839, 



62845 



PREF A C £ 



TO THE THIRD EDITION 

The design of this little volume is to present a compen- 
dious view of one of the great doctrines of the Gospel. 
It is intended to furnish a plain statement of the doctrine, 
a brief view of its proofs, and a short answer to the prin- 
cipal objections which are made against it. In doing this, 
the author has aimed to present in a small compass the 
substance of what is not elsewhere to be found, except in 
large volumes. But. as in laboring to be brief, he may 
sometimes have been obscure, he would entreat the reader, 
not for his sake, but for the truth's sake, and for his own 
sake, not to reject any part, unless by a repeated and care- 
ful perusal, he shall be well assured he is not rejecting 
that truth of God by which he must himself be judged in 
the great day. 

The first edition of these discourses was published at 
Plattsburgh in 1813, the second at Providence in 1819. 
The present edition has been prepared at the request of 
the Ecclesiastical Board of Trustees for the Propagation 
of the Gospel, and contains but few alterations from the 
preceding. If it shall aid in defending a doctrine now 
much despised and neglected, the author will feel himself 
amply rewarded for his labor. 

Newark AT, J.. May. 1839. 



SERMON L 



EPHESIANS I. 1L 

Who icorketh all things after the counsel of his 
own will 

Whex we take a survey of the world around 
us, it appears a scene of confusion. Wickedness 
is triumphant, while virtue is trodden in the dust. 
Here, we see the good man, oppressed with want, 
struggling with poverty, or groaning in a dun- 
geon ; there, we see his oppressor, rolling in 
splendor, glittering with wealth, and possessing 
more than heart could wish. In one place, we 
see fraud, and violence, and robbery prevail j and 
in another, intemperance, and lewdness, and 
erimes that ought not to be named. Atheism and 
infidelity raise their heads, and stalk abroad, while 
humble piety is compelled to shun the light, and 
take refuge among the poor, the ignorant, and the 
despised. Scoffers walk on every side, blas- 
phemers are bold and daring, and the enemies 
of the cross already begin the shouts of victory, 
But " why do the heathen rage, and the people" 
I 



8 



DECREES. 



imagine a vain thing? He that sitteth in the 
heavens shall laugh ; the Lord shall have them 
in derision." In the midst of all this confusion, 
the Lord reigns. His hand, unseen, directs and 
moves the numerous springs of all this vast and 
complicated machiner}/-. The trembling saint 
may lean with unshaken confidence upon the 
God of heaven; for it is He "who worketh all 
things after the counsel of his own will." In 
discoursing from these words, it is proposed 

I. To show that God has decreed, or fore-or- 
dained, whatsoever comes to pass. 

II. That he executes his decrees by his own 
agency. 

III. Attend to some objections which are made 
against this doctrine. 

And then conclude with an improvement of the 
whole. 

First, then, it is to be proved that God has de- 
creed, or fore-ordained, whatsoever comes to pass. 
And, 

1. That God has decreed whatsoever comes 
to pass, is evident from his possessing infinite 
power, wisdom, and goodness. None will deny 
that he has these perfections. He would no 
longer be God, if he had not. If, then, he is ft 
being of infinite wisdom, he must know what is 
best, under all possible circumstances. If he is 
a being of infinite goodness, he must choose that 
what is best, under all circumstances, should take 



PROOFS FROM REASON. 



9 



place. If he is a being of infinite power, no- 
thing- can prevent the accomplishment of what he 
chooses. We may conclude, therefore, that what- 
ever does take place is for the best, and that God 
has, from eternity, invariably chosen that it should 
take place, just as it does. 

To state this a little more at large : — The infi- 
nite wisdom and intelligence of God enable him 
to perceive what events will best promote the 
greatest good of the universe, or secure the high- 
est sum of holiness and happiness among intelli- 
gent beings. And in this he cannot possibly be 
mistaken. Before he began to create, when all 
possible systems were before his mind, he could 
not but perceive w r hich system would include and 
bring to pass the greatest sum of good. He saw 
things in all their connections and consequences. 
The smallest event could not escape his observa- 
tion. The least conceivable occurrence was as 
clearly seen by him as the greatest. And if any 
event would mar the system, or occasion the least 
defect in it, he knew it perfectly well. If the 
present system of events, taken as a whole, there- 
fore, is not the best system, and does not include 
in it and bring to pass more good than any other 
possible system, and if all its parts are not the 
best calculated to promote the great end of the 
whole, and arranged in the best possible manner, 
it cannot be for the want of knowledge in God. 
He knew it as well before he began to operate, 
as he does now, 



10 



DECREES, 



God is also infinite in goodness. When lie 
contemplated the different possible systems of 
events, and saw which was the best, which would 
include and promote the highest good of the uni- 
verse, he could not but give that system the pre- 
ference. He could not possibly reject the best, 
and choose the worst. He could not prefer a less 
good to a greater good. To say God is infinite 
in goodness, and yet prefers a less good to a 
greater good, is a contradiction. God certainly 
chooses that the best system should be carried 
into effect. He certainly chooses that the great- 
est sum of good should be secured. He certainly 
chooses that those events should take place which 
are best adapted to effect this. He certainly 
chooses that no event should take place by which 
the greatest good of the universe would suffer. 
If, therefore, the present system is not the best, ft 
is not that which God prefers. If any event 
which takes place is not, on the whole, for the 
best, it takes place contrary to God's wish, — it 
takes place although he chooses it should not take 
place, — it comes into existence in defiance of all 
that God can do to prevent it. 

But this cannot be true, for God is also infinite 
in power. He is the Almighty. None can stay 
his hand or resist his will. If he sees that an 
event is, on the whole, for the best, and chooses it 
should take place, he is able to bring it to pass. 
If he sees that an event is not for the best, and 



PROOFS FROM REASON. 



ii 



chooses it should not take place, he is able to pre- 
vent its taking* place. 

If, therefore, any supposable event is not for the 
best, God's infinite wisdom enables him to per- 
ceive that it is not, his infinite goodness prompts 
him to prevent it, and his infinite power enables 
him to prevent it. And thus, we may conclude, 
with certainty, that no such event ever comes into 
existence. No event, therefore, ever takes place, 
but what is, on the whole, for the best. But 
those events which are for the best, God chooses 
should take place. Therefore, whatever takes 
place, God chooses should take place, just as it 
does. That is, God chooses, and always has 
chosen, that the events which come to pass, should 
come to pass just as they do. But, by choice and 
decree, we mean the same thing. Therefore, 
God has, from eternity, decreed whatsoever comes 
to pass. 

To escape the force of this argument, it has 
been said that it proves contrary to truth. It has 
been said with confidence that sin is not for the 
best, and that the system would have been much 
better if sin and misery had been forever un- 
known. But this is a bold assertion. It strikes 
directly at the divine perfections. It manifests an 
arrogance and presumption, which very ill be- 
come creatures of yesterday who know nothing. 
To say this, is to tell God he might have done 
better than he has done. It is undertaking to 
1* 



IS 



DECREES. 



arraign the wisdom of God's plan, when we have 
seen but a small part of it. It argues more 
modesty in worms of the dust, to admit that God 
does wisely and well, even though we may not 
be able to see fully the propriety of what he does. 
But, if the introduction of sin was not, on the 
whole, for the best, why did not God prevent it ? 
Did he not know whether it would be for the best 
or not? Did he not know whether the greatest 
good of the universe would suffer by its introduc- 
tion? To say that God does not know what is 
for the best, is to impeach the divine wisdom. 
Why, then, did he not prevent it ? Had he no 
choice about it ? Did he look on with indiffer- 
ence ? Is he so regardless of the greatest good 
of the universe as not to care whether it is pro- 
moted or sacrificed ? To say this, is very highly 
to impeach his goodness. Did he choose to pre- 
vent it, then, but find himself unable? To say 
this, is to impeach his power. To say this, is to 
say that God is not almighty. Some, indeed, do 
say, that the sin which exists is not for the best, 
and that God knew it, and chose to prevent its 
entrance into the world; but that he could not 
prevent it, without destroying the freedom of man 
as a moral agent ; and that this is the reason he 
did not prevent it. But when they say this, they 
say that which cannot be supported; and they 
also give up the very point for which they con- 
tend, and admit the argument in all its force. 



PROOFS FROM REASON. 



13 



First, they say that which cannot be supported, 
1 1 can be shown that God could prevent man from 
sinning without infringing upon his moral agency. 
For, not to insist upon that which is true, but is 
denied by these men, to wit, that God can incline 
the will and give man a heart to obey, without 
infringing upon his moral agency, God could 
have prevented man from sinning in many other 
ways. He could have prevented man from sin- 
ning, by keeping out of his way every temptation. 
He could have confined the tempter to the prison 
of hell. He could have taken away the life of 
man, before the temptation was presented, and 
taken him to heaven while he was yet upright 
and spotless. He could have reduced all things 
again to their primitive nothing, before sin had 
ruined his work, It is manifest, then, that God 
could have prevented man from sinning, without 
touching his moral agency. But, again, when 
any say that God did not prevent man from sin- 
ning because he would thereby have destroyed his 
moral agency, they give up the point, and admit 
the argument in all its force. For, to say that 
the reason why God did not prevent man from 
sinning was, that by so doing he would have de- 
stroyed his moral agency, is the same as to say, 
that God chose man should sin, rather than take 
this means to prevent it : that is, that it was better, 
m God's view, that man should sin, than that 
his moral agency should be destroyed; in other 



14 



DECREES. 



words, that it was, upon the whole, all things be- 
ing considered, for the best that man should sin. 
It is evident, therefore, that nothing comes to pass 
but what is, on the whole, for the best ; and that 
God can, and does, choose or decree, that things 
should take place just as they do. 

2. That God has decreed whatsoever comes 
to pass, is evident from the divine fore-knowledge. 
That God from eternity infallibly foreknew every 
thing which comes to pass in time, none will deny 
who believe there is a God of infinite perfection. 
All things that are to us past, present, and to 
come, are forever present to the view of Him 
"with whom is no variableness, neither shadow 
of turning." By the fore-knowledge of God, 
and the decrees of God, are not meant the same 
thing. They are perfectly distinct from each 
other. The fore-knowledge of God is as distinct 
from his decrees, as our knowledge is from our 
determinations. But the divine fore-knowledge 
implies the divine decrees, as its foundation. 
When it is said God infallibly foreknows, it is 
meant that he foreknows without the possibility 
of being mistaken. We may form conjectures 
respecting future events; but our conjectures may 
prove true, or they may prove false. God does 
not merely conjecture that a thing will take place, 
he knows it will. But if he knows it will, it cer- 
tainly will. He cannot know a thing will be, 
which will not be. This is a contradiction, It 



PROOFS FROM REASON. 15 

is not meant that the divine fore-knowledge has 
any influence in bringing the event to pass, 
Fore-knowledge of an event can have no more 
influence upon it than after knowledge. God's 
knowledge of it can have no more influence upon 
it than our knowledge. All that is meant is, that 
if God foreknows an event, it is certain, infallibly 
certain, that that event will take place ; and all 
the powers in the universe cannot render it uncer- 
tain, unless they can render it possible for God to 
know a thing and not know it, at the same time. 
A writer of some note,* does indeed say, that "a 
thing may either be or not be, notwithstanding 
that foresight of it which we ascribe to God. : ' 
But this is impossible, unless the foresight of God 
is mere uncertain conjecture, like our own : and 
that is no ioxe-knoidedge at all, When we speak 
of uncertainties, contingencies, being or not being, 
we always have reference to ourselves. Things 
are uncertain to us, but not to God. When it is 
said, therefore, that God foreknows a particular 
event, it is meant that that event is certain to him. 
And it would be equally certain to us, if we could 
foreknow, or if God should communicate his 
knowledge of it to us. The event is certain in 
itself, or it could not be the object of the divine 
knowledge. It has a real existence in the divine 
mind. But it is a matter of uncertainty to us 
whether it will happen or not, because we are not 

* Mr. Fletcher, 



16 



DECREES. 



informed how it will be. The event is certain in 
itself, and is not made any more nor any less so, 
by any one's knowledge or want of knowledge. 
But if a future event is certain in itself, as it must 
be in order that God should foreknow it, there 
must be some cause which made it so. There 
must be some reason why it will take place rather 
than not. And since God knew all things from 
eternity, they were all certain from eternity; and 
they must have an eternal cause which made 
them certain, since nothing can operate and pro- 
duce effects, before it exists. What was this 
cause? Was it chance, or fate, or the will of 
God, or some other being? It must be one of 
these, for there is no other supposition possible. 
Was it chance? No: there is no such thing as 
chance; and if there were, chance renders no- 
thing certain, but uncertain. Was it any crea- 
ture? No: the creatures are not eternal, and 
they could not exert an agency to make any thing 
certain, before they themselves existed. Was it 
any other being? No: there is no eternal being 
but God. To deny, therefore, that it was the will 
of God, which made every thing certain from 
eternity, is to maintain the doctrine of fate. To 
say that all things are certain from eternity, and 
yet that they are not made so by the will of God, 
is to say that there is a blind, undesigning, irre- 
sistible fatality in things, which is beyond the 
power of God himself to control, and which ren- 



PROOFS FROM REASON. 



17 



ders them certain and unavoidable, without any 
means being necessary to the end, or any causes 
necessary to produce effects. This appears to be 
the Mahometan idea of fate ; and with all its ab- 
surdities and contradictions, it is the doctrine vir- 
tually maintained by all who admit the divine 
fore-knowledge, and yet deny the divine decrees. 
But there is no such thing as fate : and since all 
things are certain from eternity, God, by the most 
free, wise, and holy counsel of his own will, has 
made it certain that all things should take place 
just as they do ; that is, God, from eternity, must 
have decreed whatsoever comes to pass. 

It may be observed, further, that it is impossible 
for God to know what he will do himself, unless 
he has determined what to do. If a man asks 
me what I shall do to-morrow, it will be impossi- 
ble for me to tell him what I shall do, unless I 
have determined what to do. It is impossible for 
God to know what his creatures will do, unless he 
has determined what they shall do. For, even 
on the supposition that they can do some things 
without his immediate causation, yet, if their 
doing or not doing certain things depends upon 
his permitting or not permitting them, his hinder- 
ing or not hindering them, and he has not ye* 
determined whether he will hinder them or not, 
it is impossible for him to know whether he wiU 
hinder them or not, and consequently it is impoz^- 
sible for him to know whether they will do those 



18 



DECREES. 



things or not. If, therefore, God foreknew from 
eternity that every event would take place just as 
it does, it was because he had determined from 
eternity that every event should take place just as 
it does, because he had determined to cause those 
things which he causes, and to permit those things 
which he permits. And these embrace all events. 
To say that God only determined to make man, 
and then to leave him to the freedom of his own 
will, and yet knew how he would act, if thus left, 
is the same as to say that he chose, on the whole, 
that he should act in that manner; that is, that 
he decreed all his actions. 

3. That God has decreed whatsoever comes 
to pass, is evident from scripture. The scriptures 
represent God as having decreed whatever takes 
place in the natural world. Prov. 8. 29. "He 
gave to the sea his decree, that the waters should 
not pass his commandment: he appointed the 
foundations of the earth." Job 28. 26. "He 
made a decree for the rain, and a way for the 
lightning of the thunder." Ps. 148. 8. "Fire 
and hail, snow and vapor, stormy wind fulfilling 
his wordP But with respect to events in the 
natural world, it will probably be granted by all, 
that God has decreed them. The great question 
is, whether he has decreed the voluntary actions 
of men, and especially their wicked actions, and 
their eternal state. Let us see, then, what the 
Scriptures say upon these points. Acts 17. 26. 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE 19 

He ''hath determined the times before appointed, 
and the bounds of their habitation." : He has 
determined where men should dwell, though this 
depends upon their wills. Therefore, he must 
have determined what they should will, Job 14. 
5. "His days are determined, the number of his 
months are with thee; thou hast appointed his 
bounds that he cannot pass." He has determined 
the day of man's death ; yet this often depends 
upon his own voluntary care or neglect of him- 
self, and very often upon the will of a murderer, 
He has determined the day of judgment. Acts 
17. 31. ""He hath appointed a day. in the which 
he will judge the world in righteousness, by that 
man whom he hath ordained." He has deter- 
mined the rise and fall of kingdoms, though this 
depends upon the voluntary conduct of men, 
Dan. 4. 17. "This matter is by the decree of the 
Watchers, and the demand by the word of the 
Holy Ones: to the intent that the living may 
know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom 
of men. and giveth it to whomsoever he will" 
Rev. 17. 17. *'For God hath put in their hearts 
to fulfil his will, and to agree and give their king- 
dom unto the beast." It was his will (of decree) 
that the beast should have the kingdom. Isaiah 
14. 24. "The Lord of Hosts hath sworn, saying, 
surely as I have thought, so shall it come to pass; 
and as I have purposed, so shall it stand; that I 
will break the Assyrian in my land V Ls. 19. 
2 



20 



DECREES. 



12, 13, 14. "Where are thy wise men? and let 
them tell thee now, and let them know what the 
Lord of Hosts hath purposed upon Eg}^pt. The 
princes of Zoan are become fools, the princes of 
Noph are deceived. The Lord hath mingled a 
perverse spirit in the midst thereof; and they 
have caused Egypt to err." Is. 23. 8, 9. "Who 
hath taken his counsel against Tyre, the crowning 
city, whose merchants are princes? The Lord of 
Hosts hath purposed it, to stain the pride of all 
glory, and to bring into contempt all the honor- 
able of the earth." Zeph. 3. 8. "My determina- 
tion is, to gather the nations, that I may assemble 
the kingdoms, to pour upon them mine indigna- 
tion, even all my fierce anger." The rise and 
fall of kingdoms depend upon the wills of men : 
but they are decreed. He determined the time of 
Christ's death, though this depended upon the will 
of his murderers. Dan. 9. 24. "Seventy weeks 
are determined upon thy people, and upon thy 
holy city, to finish the transgression, and to make 
an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for 
iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness, 
and to seal up the vision and prophecy, and to 
anoint the Most Holy." 

It may be said, however, that these are general 
things, and great events ; that if God has deter- 
mined these, that does not prove that he has de- 
termined particular events and little things, which 
are unworthy of his notice. But, it may be asked, 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 21 

are not general things made up of particulars, 
and great events of small ones? If a general 
thing has been determined, all the particulars of 
which it is made up, must have been determined 
also. If a great event has been decreed, all the 
little events upon which that great event depends, 
must have been decreed also. If one link in the 
chain should fail, the whole chain would fail as 
certainly as if every link was broken. The least 
particle of dust that floats upon the wind may be 
destined to enter the lungs of an emperor, and by 
his death to change the political face of the world. 
It is evident, then, that God has his purposes re- 
specting every creature that he has made, and all 
their motions and actions, from the tallest seraph 
before his throne, to the mote that plays in the 
sunbeams, or the particle of dust that is driven by 
the winds. 



SERMON II. 



EPHESIANS I. 11. 

Who worketh all things after the counsel of his 
own will: 

We proceed with tfie evidence from scripture 
that God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass. 

It is sometimes said that whatever else the 
scriptures may represent God as having decreed, 
they do not say that he has decreed sin. The 
wicked actions of men certainly were not fore- 
ordained. To this, it may be answered, that 
some of the events mentioned in the passages 
already quoted were the wicked actions of men. 
For the kings of the earth "to agree and give 
their kingdom unto the beast," was a great sin ; 
but God had decreed it, and "put in their hearts" 
to do so. Assyria, and Egypt, and Tyre were 
destroyed by the wicked actions of wicked men, 
fulfilling the decrees of God. But let us attend 
to what the scriptures further say. Luke 22. 22. 
"And truly the Son of man goeth as it was deter- 
mined" Mark 14. 21. "The Son of man indeed 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 



23 



goeth as it is written of him.*' The circum- 
stances attending the apprehension, condemnation 
and death of Christ depended upon the wills of 
men, and upon their wicked wills too: but they 
were all fore-determined, for he went exactly "as 
it was defer mined''- Acts 2. 23. "Him, being 
delivered by the determinate counsel and fore- 
knowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked 
hands have crucified and slain." Acts 4. 27, 28. 
"For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, 
whom thou hast annointed, both Herod and Pon- 
tius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of 
Israel, were gathered together, for to do what- 
soever' 1 (observe, it is neither more nor less, but 
■whatsoever.) "thy hand and thy counsel deter- 
mined before to be done." The betraying, con- 
demning, mocking, scourging, and crucifying the 
Lord of glory, was certainly great and aggravated 
wickedness : but it was all decreed. It was "de- 
termined" that he should go in this manner, being 
betrayed by Judas. It was God's ''determinate 
counsel" that Herod and Pilate, the Gentiles and 
people of Israel, should do all this to him. But 
they did it with " wicked hands.'' It was impos- 
sible that they should do it with any other than 
wicked hands. The apostle speaks of some. 1st 
Peter 2. 8. " Which stumble at the word, being- 
disobedient; whereunto also they were appointed. 1 ' 
They were appointed to stumble, appointed to be 

disobedient. God had also decreed the wicked- 
er 



24 DECREES. 

ness of the Egyptians in oppressing the Israel- 
ites, the wickedness of Pharaoh in refusing to 
let Israel go, the wickedness of Sihon in coming 
out to fight against Israel at Jahaz, the wicked- 
ness of Eli's sons in refusing to listen to their 
father's reproof, the wickedness of Absalom in 
raising a rebellion against his father, and in com- 
mitting incest with his father's wives, the wicked- 
ness of the king of Assyria in distressing Heze- 
kiah and Jerusalem, the wickedness of Nebuchad- 
nezzar in destroying so many nations to gratify 
his ambition, and a multitude of other sins, which 
are foretold in the sacred volume. If he had not 
determined that these things should take place, he 
could not have foretold or foreknown that they 
would take place. When he foretold them, he 
must have intended that his word should be ac- 
complished, or that it should fail. We have no 
reason to believe he intended that his word should 
fail. When he directed the prophet to say that 
these things should come to pass, he must have 
intended that they should come to pass. He 
intended that the event should accord with the 
prophecy, and not disagree with it. He intended 
that the prediction should prove true, and not that 
it should prove false. God has also decreed the 
eternal state of angels and men. We read of 
"elect angels," and Jude 6, of those who are "re- 
served in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto 
the judgment of the great day." Of men, God 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 25 

has appointed some to be "vessels of mercy, and 
some to be vessels of wrath," "some to honor, 
and some to dishonor." The scripture says, Acts 
13. 48. "As many as were ordained to eternal 
life believed." Observe, it is not said, as many as 
believed were ordained to eternal life, as if believ- 
ing was first, and in order to election, as the cause 
of it, according to the opinion of some, but the 
contrary. Election was unto obedience. They 
were elected to obey. They believed because 
they were ordained to believe and be saved. Pe- 
ter says, 1 Peter 1. 2. "Elect, according to the 
fore-knowledge of God the Father, through sane- 
tification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprink- 
ling of the blood of Jesus Christ." Election was 
unto obedience, not obedience unto election. And 
Paul says, Eph. 1. 4. "According as he hath 
chosen us in him before the foundation of the 
world, that we should be holyp Not because they 
were holy, or it was foreseen they would be holy, 
but that they might be. And the assertion is ex- 
press, "he hath chosen us before the foundation 
of the world" He elected them from eternity. 
Our Lord says, Mat, 11. 25, 26. "I thank thee, 
O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because 
thou hast hid these things from the wise and pru- 
dent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even 
so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." 
These things were revealed to some, that they 
might be saved, and hidden from others, that they 



26 



DECREES. 



might be lost. Mat. 13. 11. "It is given unto 
you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of 
heaven, but to them it is not given." But as the 
knowledge of these mysteries was necessary to 
eternal life, it was given to some and not to others, 
that some might be saved and others not. John 
6. 37. "All that the Father giveth me shall come 
to me." He does not say, all that come to m£, the 
Father will give me, as if it depended upon them 
solely, and not upon God's decree, how many 
should come. Verse 65. "No man can come 
unto me, except it were given unto him of my 
Father." But to some it is not given. See Mat, 
13. 11. before cited. John 15. 16. "Ye have 
not chosen me, but I have chosen you." That is, 
Christ chose them first. The apostle says, 1 
Thess. 5. 9. "For God hath not appointed us to 
wrath, but to obtain salvation." Implying that 
he had appointed others to wrath, while he ap- 
pointed them to salvation. The prophet says, Is. 
28. 13. "The word of the Lord was unto them 
precept upon precept, precept upon precept ; line 
upon line, line upon line ; here a little, and there 
a little ; that they might go, and fall backward, 
and be broken, and snared, and taken." The 
word of the Lord was to them the savor of death 
unto death, and it was sent to them, not that they 
might be saved, but "that they might go, and fall 
backward, and be broken, and snared, and taken." 
In 2 Thess. 2. 13. it is said, "God hath, from the 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 



27 



beginning, chosen you to salvation." But if he 
has chosen some to salvation, and not all, he has 
chosen the rest to perdition. Jude speaks cf cer- 
tain wicked men, verse 4, who "crept in un- 
awares, who were before of old ordained to this 
condemnation." Peter speaks of some, 2 Peter 
2. 12. of whom he says, "But these, as natural 
brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, 
speak evil of the things that they understand not, 
and shall utterly perish in their own corruption." 
They were "made to be taken and destroyed* 1 '* 
Prov. 16. 4. "The Lord hath made all things 
for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of 
evil.' 1 He has made the wicked for the day of 
evil, to answer some important purpose in that 
day. 

Thus, then, it appears that we have abundant 
scripture evidence that God has decreed all events 
in the natural and moral world, the state, charac- 
ter, and condition of angels and men, here and 
hereafter, with all their conduct, good and evil ; in 
other words, that he has fore-ordained whatsoever 
comes to pass. 

Having established the first proposition, the 
way is prepared to proceed to the 

It Which was to show that God executes 
his decrees by his own agency; or, in other 
words, that God, having decreed all things, does 
himself actually work all things, after the counsel 
of his own will. 



28 



DIVINE AGENCY. 



When it is said that God executes his decrees 
by his own agency, it is meant, that God does not 
merely permit his creatures to act as they do, as 
some say, but that, having decreed all the motions 
and actions of all his creatures, he does, by his 
own agency, cause and bring to pass all those 
motions and actions. Not that God is the only 
agent in the universe, and that creatures do not 
move and act, but that they are so dependent upon 
God, that they never move and act any further, 
nor in any other way, than they are caused to 
move and act by the immediate operation of divine 
power. Not that God does not work by means, 
but that means in themselves have no efficacy. 
Not that he does not make use of instrumental, 
or what are termed second causes, but that he 
actually causes the operations of these second 
causes themselves. So that he not only makes 
the rain to descend and the sun to shine, but by 
his agency also makes the grass to grow, and the 
corn to spring : and if this agency was not em- 
ployed, the influence of the rain and the sun never 
would produce the effect. So that he not only 
presents motives to the understanding of his intel- 
ligent creatures, but by his agency also causes 
their wills to act in the view of those motives ; 
and that if this agency was not employed, their 
wills would never act. That God does thus work 
all things after the counsel of his own will, is 
evident, 



PROOFS FROM REASON. 29 

L From the nature of creatures. They are 
dependent. The very idea of a creature, is of 
something that is dependent upon its creator : de- 
pendent for all that it has, all that it is, and all 
that it does. An independent creature is a con- 
tradiction. Independence is an attribute of God 
alone, and cannot in the nature of the thing be 
communicated. To say that a being is indepen- 
dent, and yet that he received his independence 
from another, is to say that he is independent, and 
yet dependent upon another, which is a contradic- 
tion. To say that a being may be independent in 
any one respect, though not in others, and yet 
that he received that independence which he has, 
is also a contradiction, for it makes him depen- 
dent and independent in the same respect. To 
say that creatures are dependent on God for their 
being, for the continuance of their lives, and for 
all their powers, but yet not dependent on him for 
their actions; or in other words, that God has 
created, and preserves them, and given them a 
power of acting independently of him, runs into 
the same absurdity. For it is the same as to say, 
that they have an independent power of acting 
for which they are dependent ; that is, that they 
have a species of independence which is depen- 
dent. The supposition of an independent power 
of acting in the creatures, is also attended with 
this further difficulty, that it renders it impossible 
for God to control their actions, so that his de- 



so 



DIVINE AGENCY. 



crees may fail, and his whole plan be defeated. A 
being cannot be controlled any farther than he is 
dependent. If the creature is dependent on God 
for his power of acting, but not for the exercise 
of that power, then it is impossible for God to con- 
trol the exercise of that power, in any other way 
than by withdrawing the power itself. If, then, 
that power of acting is continued, the creature will 
be as likely to exercise it in direct opposition to 
the decree of God, as in conformity to that decree. 
And thus, although God has decreed that the crea- 
ture shall will and act in a particular manner, it 
will still be uncertain whether he will not will and 
act in a manner directly the contrary. If Pharaoh 
had a power of acting independently of God, then, 
although God had decreed he should not let Israel 
go till he had sent his ten plagues upon him, he 
might have let them go at the first solicitation, 
and it would have been impossible for God to 
prevent it. And the supposition of an indepen- 
dent power of acting in the creature is equally 
inconsistent with the divine fore-knowledge. For 
if the creature has an independent power of act- 
ing, it is impossible to know beforehand how he 
will exercise it. He is as likely to exercise it 
in one way as in another. It is perfectly un- 
certain how he will act, till he does act. An 
independent power of acting, and a previous cer- 
tainty how a man will act, are totally inconsistent 
with each other. For if it is previously certain 



PROOFS FROM REASON- 



31 



that he will act in one particular way, it is as 
impossible that he should act in any other way, 
as it is that a thing should be certain and un- 
certain at the same time, If man has an inde- 
pendent power of acting, and his choice is not 
influenced by any thing extrinsic to himself, he 
may act either way. And although God has 
foreknown that he would act in one way, he may 
still act in a manner directly the contrary. And 
thus, God may infallibly know a thing will come 
to pass, which yet never will come to pass, which 
is a contradiction. It is evident, then, that if God 
has infallibly decreed all the motions and actions 
of his creatures, that he executes those decrees by 
causing all their motions and actions. Or, if we 
do not say he has decreed, but only say he fore- 
knows all their motions and actions, it is equally 
certain that they are entirely dependent on him 
for all their motions and actions, as much as for 
their existence. 

2. It is also evident from the nature of our 
motions and actions. They are effects. Every 
thing which has not existed from eternity, but 
come into existence in time, is an effect, and must 
have a cause. To say that they are not effects, 
and have no cause, is to say that some things may 
come into existence without a cause. And if 
some things may come into existence without a 
cause, then all things may come into existence 
without a cause. And thus we run into atheism. 
3 



32 



DIVINE AGENCY. 



If our actions are effects, and have a cause, then 
God must be the cause, or we ourselves must be 
the cause, or some other creature must be the 
cause. But every cause must operate, in order 
to produce its effect. No effect follows from a 
cause, without the operation of the cause. And 
that operation is not the effect itself, but is the 
causing act by which the effect is produced. If, 
then, we are the cause of our own actions, we. 
must cause them by a causing act ; that is, we 
must operate in order to produce the effect. But 
this operation, or causing act, is an action also, 
and needs to be accounted for, as much as the 
other. If we are the cause of that also, we 
must, in causing it, have performed a previous 
action; and in causing that previous action, we 
must have performed another previous to that, 
and so on, till we come back to our first action ; 
and in causing our first action, we must have per- 
formed another previous to it, that is, we acted 
before we acted, or performed an action before the 
first, which is a gross absurdity. The only way 
of avoiding this absurdity, is by saying that we 
cause our own actions without a causing act, or 
without doing any thing to cause them ; that we 
produce our own actions without making any exer- 
tion to produce them, and without any intention of 
doing it; that in a sovereign, independent manner 
we determine what our acts of will shall be, with- 
out exercising any power to determine them, or per- 



PROOFS FROM REASON. 



33 



forming any determining act. But this entirely 
subverts the meaning of language, and contra- 
dicts common sense. To cause, to produce, to 
determine, are words which denote activity, which 
signify that some exertion is made, in order to 
effect something. And the thing effected by this 
exertion is the action which is thus caused or pro- 
duced. That which does nothing in order to pro- 
duce an effect, is no cause of that effect. To say 
that we cause our own volitions or actions, when 
we put forth no exertion to cause them, is as ab- 
surd as to say, that any other thing causes them, 
which puts forth no exertion. I can as soon be- 
lieve that another man causes my actions, without 
his making any exertion in order to do it, or that 
a stock or a stone causes them, as I can believe 
that I cause them myself, without making any 
exertion in order to cause them. That which 
does nothing in order to produce an effect, does 
not produce any effect, and is no cause. It is 
certain, therefore, that if we cause our own 
actions, we must cause them by making some 
exertions, or performing previous actions ; which 
brings us to the absurdity of performing one ac- 
tion before the first. It is evident, then, that we 
are not the cause of our own actions. Shall we 
say, then, that any other creature is the cause? 
For instance, shall we say that Satan is the cause 
of our wicked actions ? This will run into the 
same absurdity. For, if Satan causes one of our 



34 



DIVINE AGENCY. 



actions, he does it by a causing act of his own ; 
and he must have caused thai by a previous act, 
and so on, till we bring him to ar* act before the 
first. If, then, we are not the cause of our own 
actions, and no other creature is the cause of them, 
it follows that God is the cause of them. 

Some have said that our actions are caused by 
motives, and not by the agency of God. They 
have represented motive as acting with a kind of 
mechanical influence upon the mind, as the 
springs do upon the wheels of a watch, and caus- 
ing its volitions as the latter do the motions of the 
wheels. They have represented that God has 
established certain laws in the moral, as well as 
in the natural world, and that mind is governed 
by these laws, as well as matter, without any im- 
mediate agency of God. That, as when the artist 
has completed his watch, put every thing in order, 
wound it up, and set it in motion, it is not neces- 
sary for him to put his hands to the wheels to 
make them go, so, God having made all things, 
and established these laws, it is wholly unneces- 
sary for him to put forth an immediate agency to 
bring to pass any event. Others have adopted 
this system in part only, and supposed that it is 
necessary that God should put forth an immediate 
agency to cause all the good actions of his crea- 
tures, but not their wicked actions ; and have said 
that it was only necessary for God to remove re- 
straints from wicked men, and they would as cer^ 



PROOFS FROM REASON. 35 

tainly act wickedly, as a heavy body would de- 
scend to the earth if that which supported it was 
taken away. If we ask. why a heavy body de- 
scends under these circumstances, the reply is, it 
is by a law of nature : the attraction of gravita- 
tion causes it to descend. And if we ask, why 
the man acts wickedly when God takes off his 
restraints, the reply is, it is by a law of nature : 
he is then under the influence of bad motives. 
What then is meant by the laws of nature ? Is 
there some inherent power in things, which ope- 
rates, and produces all the admirable effects 
which we behold, and this as much indepen- 
dently of God, as the motions of a watch are 
independent of the artist who made it? No. 
This is not the case. It certainly is not, in the 
material world. Matter is a substance wholly 
senseless and inactive. It is not capable of put- 
ting forth any exertion, or producing any effect. 
By the laws of nature, in the material world, we 
always mean the established mode of divine ope- 
ration. When God exerts his power to produce 
effects in the material world, in a uniform man- 
ner, we call it a law of nature. He uniformly 
causes heavy bodies to gravitate to the centre of 
the earth. It is, therefore, said to be a law of 
nature, that heavy bodies should always tend to 
the centre. And in like manner, if we speak of 
the mind ; s being governed by certain laws, the 
only thing we can mean is, that God governs it, 
3* 



36 



DIVINE AGENCY. 



by his immediate agency, according to certain 
established modes. The term motive is not al- 
ways used in a definite manner. We sometimes 
use it to signify the mental exertion or act of the 
will itself. As when we speak of a man's exter- 
nal conduct, and inquire whether he was praise 
or blame worthy, we ask what were his motives? 
The meaning then is, what were the volitions or 
acts of will, which produced such external con- 
duct? When we use motive in this sense, and 
say that motive is the cause of action, we mean 
that volition is the cause of external action. And 
even then, we only mean instrumental cause. 
But when we are inquiring for the cause of voli- 
tion, or internal action, and speak of motive, we 
mean by it the object of the choice, the external 
thing chosen. When motive is taken in this 
sense, motive is not the cause of choice. It is 
true, that in this sense of motive, the mind never 
acts without a motive, but that is only saying, the 
mind never chooses without an object which is 
chosen. But the object chosen, and the cause of 
choice, are very different things. An object pre- 
sented to the mind, is a motive to choose, but it is 
the immediate agency of God alone that can 
cause the mind to act when the motive is pre- 
sented. If it is said, therefore, to be a law of 
nature, that the same motives should produce the 
same effects upon the mind, and cause it to act, 
under the same circumstances, in the same way. 



PROOFS FROM REASON> 37 

the only thing that can be meant is, that God, by 
his agency, causes the mind, in the same circum- 
stances, and in the view of the same motives, to 
act in a uniform manner. 



SERMON III. 



EPHESIANS I. 11. 

Who worketh all things after the counsel of his 
own will. 

We proceed with the proof of the second pro- 
position, which is, that God executes his decrees 
by his own agency. 

3. That God, by his agency, brings to pass 
whatever comes to pass, is evident from scripture. 
The text asserts it in the plainest and strongest 
terms. " Who worketh all things after the counsel 
of his own will. 11 It does not say some things, but 
all things. It does not say he permits all things 
to take place, after the counsel of his own will, 
but that he himself "worketh all things after 
the counsel of his own will." His universal 
agency is also asserted in the following scrip- 
tures: Rom. 11, 36. "For of him, and through 
him, and to him, are all things." Not, some 
things of him, and some things of ourselves. Acts 
17. 28. "For in him," (that is, by him,) "we live, 
and move, and have our being." Not, in him we 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 



39 



live, but move in and by ourselves, 2 Cor. 3. 5. 
" Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think 
any thing, as of ourselves."' It does not say, we 
are not able to think any good thing, as it is fre- 
quently quoted, but any thing, any thing what- 
ever, whether good or evil. And if we are not 
able to think, we are not able to act of ourselves. 
Job "23. 13, 14. "He is in one mind, and who can 
turn him ? and what his soul desireth, even that 
he doeth. For he perform eth the thing that is 
appointed for me." That is, he never change? 
his mind, but whatever he desires should come to 
pass, he brings to pass: and since he "desireth." 
that is, chooses, or decrees, whatsoever comes to 
pass, he "doettr or "perform^th"' whatsoever 
comes to pass, that is, he brings it to pass by his 
own agency. 1 Cor. 12. 6. is the same God 
which worketh all in all." This assertion 
is universal and unlimited, though some would 
wish to limit it. It is not said, it is the same God 
who worketh all good things in all good men, but 
(pant a en pa si.) all things in all things. Mat. 
10. 29. 30, "Are not two sparrows sold for a far- 
thing I and one of them shall not fall on the 
ground without your Father. But the very hairs 
of your head are all numbered. " Surely, if a 
sparrow or a hair of our head cannot fall on the 
ground without the agency of God, the divine 
&eencv is universal. Jer. 10. "23. "O Lord, I 
know that the way of man is not in himself : it is 



40 



DIVINE AGENCY. 



not in man that walketh to direct his steps." 
Prov. 16. 9. "A man's heart deviseth his way: 
but the Lord directeth his steps." But they are 
all directed by his own will. Therefore, God 
directs them by directing his will. Verse 33. 
" The lot is cast into the lap ; but the whole dis- 
posing thereof is of the Lord." Dan. 4. 17. 
"The Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, 
and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth 
up over it the basest of men." The rise and fall 
of kingdoms depend upon the wills of men: con- 
sequently, God directs their wills. Mat. 6. 26. 
"Behold the fowls of the air; for they sow not, 
neither do they reap, nor gather into barns ; yet 
your heavenly Father feedeth them." Ps. 104. 
27, 28. "These wait all upon thee, that thou may 
give them their meat in due season. That thou 
givest them, they gather; thou openest thine 
hand, they are filled with good." Amos 3. 6. 
"Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath 
not done itl" Is. 45. 6, 7. "I am the Lord, and 
there is none else. I form the light, and create 
darkness ; I make peace, and create evil. I the 
Lord do all these things," It would be difficult 
to find language to express the universal agency 
of God in stronger terms than these passages 
express it. With respect to the last two, it is in- 
deed objected, that they have reference only to 
natural evil. But there appears to be no founda- 
tion for this objection. The interrogation, "shall 



PROOFS 



FROM SCRIPTURE. 



41 



there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done 
it?" denies the existence of any evil, of any kind, 
which the Lord had not caused. And the last 
passage quoted. U I form the light, and create 
darkness: I make peace, and create evil," is ad- 
dressed to Cyrus, a Persian, who believed there 
were two gods, equally independent and almighty, 
of which one caused all the good, natural and 
moral, that takes place in the universe, and the 
other all the evil ; as some appear to believe, at 
the present day. To correct this error, the Lord 
tells Cyrus that he alone is God, and causes all 
these things himself. 

That God by his agency causes whatever takes 
place in the natural world, will not perhaps be 
denied. Ps. 104. 14. &c. -'He causeth the grass 
to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of 
man He watereth the hills from his chambers. 
He sendeth the springs into the vallies, which 
run among the hills." Ps. 147. 16. 17. IS. -He 
Sfiveth snow like wool : he scattereth the hoar 
frost like ashes. He casteth forth his ice like 
morsels : who can stand before his cold ? He 
sendeth out his word, and melteth them: He 
causeth his wind to blow, and the waters now.' 7 
Ps, 104. 19. "He appointeth the moon for sea- 
sons: the sua knoweth his going down." Job 9. 
S. 10. Which alone spreadeth out the heavens, 
Which doeth great things past finding out." 
That God causes natural evil. pain, sickness and 



42 



DIVINE AGENCY. 



death, will also be granted. Job 5. 6, 18. "Af- 
fliction cometh not forth of the dust, neither doth 
trouble spring out of the ground. He maketh 
sore, and bindeth up : he woundeth, and his hands 
make whole." Deut. 32. 39. " I, even I am he, 
and there is no God with me : I kill, and I make 
alive ; I wound, and I heal." Ps. 102. 23. "He 
weakened my strength in the way: he shortened 
my days " But natural evil often comes by the 
instrumentality of wicked men, and death often 
by the hand of the murderer. Therefore, if it 
is God that kills, then it is he that directs the 
hand of the murderer, and that governs his will. 

That God causes the good actions of his crea- 
tures must also be granted. To the PhiJippians 
the apostle says, Phil. 2. 13. "It is God which 
worketii in you both to will and to do of his 
good pleasure." They will and do, but God 
causes them to will and do. Repentance is his 
gift. Arts 5. 31. Christ is "exalted — to give 
repentance to Israel." 2 Tim. 2. 25. " God, per- 
ad venture, will give them repentance." But it is 
a voluntary exercise, and men are exhorted and 
commanded to repent. Faith is the gift of God, 
and it is also the voluntary exercise of the crea- 
ture. Eph. 2. 8. "Faith; and that not of your- 
selves ; it is the gift of God." And Christ is 
called, Heb. 12. 2. "the author and finisher of 
our faith." And yet we are exhorted to "believe 
on the Lord Jesus Christ." Love is his gift. 1 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE 



43 



John 4. 7. "Love one another: for love is of 
God. r ' But it is a voluntary exercise, and is the 
sum of what God requires of us. We are de- 
pendent on God for all gracious exercises, Gal, 
5, 2% 23. "But the fruit of the Spirit is love, 
joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, 
faith, meekness, temperance.'' All these are 
exercises of the creature, but they are produced 
in him by the Holy Ghost. A new heart is the 
gift of God ; and it is also the voluntary exercise 
of the creature. Ezek, 36. 26. "A new heart 
also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put 
within you ; and I will take away the stony heart 
out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart 
of flesh." And yet we are commanded, Ezek, 
18. 31. "Make you a new heart, and a new 
spirit." We cannot walk in God's statutes with- 
out choosing. That is no obedience, which is 
not voluntary. But God says, Ezek. 36.27. "I 
will put my spirit within you, and cause you to 
walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judge- 
ments and do them." He promises to cause 
them to choose. The Psalmist says, Ps. 119. 
32, &c. "I will run the way of thy command- 
ments, when thou shalt enlarge my heart. Give 
me understanding, and I shall keep thy law : yea. 
I shall observe it with my whole heart. Make 
me to go in the path of thy commandments. In- 
cline my heart unto thy testimonies, and not to 
covetousness." He prays God to make him to 
4 



44 



DIVINE AGENCY. 



go, and to incline his heart, which, can mean: no- 
thing else than causing him to choose. 

Let us now attend to some scriptures which? 
assert the agency of God in causing the wicked 
actions of his creatures. Pro v. 21. 1. "The 
king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, he turneth 
it whithersoever he will" If he has decreed he 
shall commit sin, he turneth it to commit sin. 
Ps. 105. 25. "He turned their heart to hate his 
people." Hating his people was a voluntary 
exercise, and a very wicked one; but God 
"turned their heart" to do it. The Psalmist 
prays, Ps. 141. 4. "Incline not my heart to any 
evil thing, to practise wicked works with men 
that Work iniquity." It would be highly im- 
proper to pray thus, if God never did such things, 
and especially if he could not do such things 
without bringing a stain upon his character. 
The Psalmist also prays, as before cited, "Incline 
my heart unto thy testimonies, and not to covet- 
ousness," which implies that God does, some- 
times, incline the heart to covetousness. Rev. 17. 
17. "For God hath put in their hearts to fulfil 
his will, and to agree and give their kingdom 
unto the beast." To give their kingdom to the 
beast, and not to God, was a great sin ; but God 
"put in their hearts" to do it. The inspired 
prophet says, Isa. 63. 17. "O Lord, why hast 
thou made us to err from thy ways, and hard- 
ened our heart from thy fear?" To err from 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 



45 



God's ways, is to sin; but, it seems, God had 
made them do it. 2 Sam. 24. 1. "The anger of 
the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he 
moved David against them to say, Go, number 
Israel and Judah." It is indeed said, in 1 Chron. 
21. 1. "And Satan stood up against Israel, and 
provoked David to number Israel." But there 
is no contradiction here. One passage speaks 
of the agency God had in it, and the other of the 
agency Satan had in it. Both are true, and they 
are perfectly consistent with each other. Satan 
tempted David, and God caused him to choose, 
or "moved" him to comply. And besides, Satan 
is only God's instrument. But when David had 
done it, he says, " I have sinned greatly in that I 
have done." And God punished him with the 
pestilence for it. If this language does not ex- 
press the agency of God in causing wicked ac- 
tions, in what language can it be expressed % But 
let us proceed. Isa. 53. 10, &c. "It pleased the 
Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief." 
He was "stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted." 
How did God bruise his Son, and smite him? 
Manifestly, by causing wicked men to do it ; for 
otherwise it could not be said that the Lord 
bruised him. Acts 3. 18. "But those things 
which God before had showed by the mouth of 
all his prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath 
so fulfilled." That is, God hath so fulfilled, by 
causing wicked men to bruise his Son and smite 



46 



DIVINE AGENCY. 



him, as lie had decreed and foretold. Gen. 45. 5, 
&c. Joseph says to his brethren, "Now, there- 
fore, be not grieved, for God did send me before 
you to preserve life. And God sent me before 
you to preserve you a posterity in the earth. So 
now, it was not you that sent me hither, but 
God." How did God send Joseph into Egypt? 
Manifestly, by causing his brethren to send him 
there. But Joseph says to them, Gen. 50, 20. 
"As for you, ye thought evil against me, but God 
meant it unto good." God had a good design to 
accomplish through the instrumentality of their 
wickedness, though they meant no such thing. 
God calls the king of Assyria the "rod of his 
anger," and says, Isa. 10. 6. "I will send him 
against a hypocritical nation, and against the peo- 
ple of my wrath will I give him a charge." He 
afterwards calls it his work, which the Assyrian 
did, and asserts his own agency in performing it. 
Verse 12. "When the Lord hath performed his 
whole work" (that is, by the Assyrian, as his 
instrument,) "upon Mount Zion, and on Jerusa- 
lem" — He then declares that he will punish the 
Assyrian for his pride and stoutness of heart, in 
boasting as if he had done it, by the strength of 
his hand, when he was only God's instrument, 
and says, verse 15. "Shall the axe boast itself 
against him that heweth therewith? Or shall the 
saw magnify itself against him that shaketh it? 
As if the rod should shake itself against them 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 47 

that lift it up, or as if the staff should lift up itself 
as if it were no wood." Here it appears, that 
God sent him, and God performed the work; 
which could not have been the case, unless God 
caused him to do it. And the Assyrian is repre- 
sented as much God's instrument, and as much 
moved by him in all this business, as the rod, and 
the saw, and the axe, by the hand of the work- 
man. (See the whole passage.) He calls the 
king of Babylon his "battle-axe, and weapons of 
war:" ' ; for with thee, (says he) will I break in 
pieces the nations:' Jer. 51. 20. And again, 
verse 7. " Babylon hath been a golden cup in the 
Lord's hand, that made all the earth drunken." 
He calls it also, Jer. 50. 23. "The hammer of 
the whole earth." Now, God could not be said 
to do what the king of Babylon did, unless he 
caused him to do it as his instrument, and as 
really employed his own agency, as the man does 
who moves an axe, a hammer, or a rod, with his 
hand. God asserts his agency in causing the 
Medes and Persians to come against Babylon. 
Jer. 50. 9. "For lo, I will raise, and cause to 
come up against Babylon, an assembly of great 
nations from the north country." Verse 25, "The 
Lord hath opened his armory, and hath brought 
forth the weapons of his indignation : for this is 
the work of the Lord God of Hosts in the land 
of the Chaldeans." He asserts his agency in 
causing the Syrians to come against Israel. Isa. 
4* 



48 



1)IVINE AGENCY 



9. 11. "The Lord shall set up the adversaries of 
Rezin against him, and join his enemies together." 
But these instruments had no regard to God in 
what they did. It was all to gratify their own 
wicked passions. It is said, 1 Kings 11. 14. 
" The Lord stirred up an adversary unto Solomon, 
Hadad the Edomite " And verse 23, 25. " God 
stirred him up another adversary, Rezon the son 
of Eliadah ; and he abhorred Israel, and reigned 
over Syria." God asserts his agency in bringing 
the armies against Judah. 2 Kings 24. 2. "And 
the Lord sent against him bands of the Chaldees, 
and bands of the Syrians, and bands of the Moab- 
ites, and bands of the children of Ammon, and 
sent them against Judah to destroy it." But they 
had no regard to God in all this, and were after- 
wards severely punished for their wickedness in 
doing it ; as appears from the prophecies against 
them. 1 Chron. 5. 26. "And the God of Israel 
stirred up the spirit of Pul, king of Assyria, and 
the spirit of Tilgathpilneser, king of Assyria, 
and he carried them away." He, that is, God, 
carried them away, by the instrumentality of 
these wicked kings. In 2 Chron. 11. 4. speak- 
ing of the rebellion of Jeroboam and the ten 
tribes, it is said, " Thus saith the Lord, Ye shall 
not go up, nor fight against your brethren; for 
this thing is done of me." In 2 Chron. 21. 16. 
it is said, "Moreover, the Lord stirred up against 
Jehoram the spirit of the Philistines, and of the 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 49 

Arabians, and they came up into Judah, and 
brake into it." Isa. 13. 17. Respecting Babylon 
God says, "Behold, I will stir up the Medes 
against them." Isa. 46. 10, It. Respecting 
Cyrus, God says, "My counsel shall stand, and 
I will do all my pleasure; calling a ravenous 
bird from the east, the man that executeth my 
counsel from a far country : yea, I have spoken 
it, I will also bring it to pass ; I have purposed 
it, I will also do it." Jer. 25. 9. Respecting the 
Jews, he says, "Behold, I will send and take all 
the families of the north, saith the Lord, and 
Nebuchadrezzar, the king of Babylon, my ser- 
vant, and will bring them against this land." 
When one nation has executed the judgments of 
God upon another, by plundering, oppressing, and 
destroying it, in a most barbarous and wicked 
manner, then God raises up another, and makes 
use of it, as his sword, for the punishment of the 
first; and afterwards raises up another for the 
punishment of that, and so on. God is the prime 
agent, and they are his "hand," his "sword," his 
"rod," his "battle-axe," to use the language of 
scripture, that is, they are the instruments by 
which he executes his vengeance. Zech. 8. 10. 
Speaking of the former state of the Jews, God 
says, "Neither was there any peace to him that 
went out or came in, because of the affliction : for 
I set all men every one against his neighbor." 
Observe, it is not said he merely suffered them to 



BO 



DIVINE AGE NOV. 



fall upon one another, but he actually set then! 
one against another. Judges 9. 23. It is said, 
"Then God sent an evil spirit between Abimelech 
and the men of Shechem." And the consequence 
was, that they immediately fell to destroying one 
another. He did something more than to take 
off restraints, he "sent an evil spirit." And 1 
Kings 22. 23. the prophet tells Ahab, "The 
Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all 
these thy prophets." The design of God was, to 
persuade Ahab to go to Ramoth-Gilead, that he 
might fall there ; and to effect this, he " put a 
lying spirit" in the mouth of Ahab's false pro- 
phets, and caused them to promise him success. 
(See the whole passage.) To" David God says, 
2 Sam. 12. 11. "Behold, I will raise up evil 
against thee out of thine own house, and I will 
take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them 
unto thy neighbor, and he shall lie with thy 
wives in the sight of this sun." This could only 
be fulfilled by his causing the wicked conduct of 
Absalom. Job says, chap. 1. 21. "The Lord 
gave, and the Lord hath taken away." But it 
was Satan and wicked men that had taken away 
all that he had. Now, if God did it, he must 
have done it by causing them to do it, as his in- 
struments. When God sent Moses with his 
message to Pharaoh, he said to Moses, Exod. 4. 
21. "But I will harden his heart, that he shall 
not let the people go." This hardness of heart 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 



51 



was not a defect in Pharaoh's natural powers, for 
which he would have been excusable, but it was 
wilful wickedness, it was obstinacy and opposition 
to God : as appears from the whole history : and 
God declares that he caused it. He says again, 
chap. 7. 3. "And I will harden Pharaoh's heart." 
Verse 13. "And he hardened Pharaoh's heart, 
that he hearkened not unto them; as the Lord 
had said." Chap. 9. 12. "And the Lord har- 
dened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened 
not unto them, as the Lord had spoken unto 
Moses." Verse 14—16. God says to Pharaoh, 
"For I will at this time send all my plagues upon 
thine heart, and upon thy servants, and upon thy 
people ; that thou mayest know that there is none 
like me in all the earth. For now I will stretch 
out my hand, that I may smite thee and thy peo- 
ple with pestilence ; and thou shalt be cut off from 
the earth. And in very deed for this cause hav£ 
I raised the up, for to show in thee my power ; 
and that my name may be declared throughout 
all the earth." These plagues, which God said 
he would send upon his heart, could be nothing 
else than that wicked obstinacy or hardness of 
heart which he caused in him, and which was 
productive of such terrible consequences. After 
the plague of hail, it is said, verse 27, 28. "And 
Pharaoh sent, and called for Moses and Aaron, 
and said unto them, I have sinned this time ; the 
Lord is righteous, and I and my people are 



52 



DIVINE A.GENCY. 



wicked. Entreat the Lord (for it is enough) that 
there be no more mighty thunderings and hail ; 
and I will let you go, and ye shall stay no longer." 
Here Pharaoh seemed willing: to let them go, 
and gave his consent; but the Lord hardened his 
heart, so that he withdrew the consent he had 
given, and again refused to let them go. Verse 
35. "And the heart of Pharaoh was hardened." 
Chap. 10. 1. "And the Lord said unto Moses, go 
in unto Pharaoh : for I have hardened his heart, 
and the heart of his servants." After the plague 
of the locusts, it is said, verse 16 — 20. "Then 
Pharaoh called for Moses and Aaron in haste ; 
and he said, I have sinned against the Lord your 
God, and against you. Now, therefore, forgive, 
I pray thee, my sin, only this once, and entreat 
the Lord your God, that he may take away from 
me this death only. And he went out from 
Pharaoh, and entreated the Lord. But the Lord 
hardened Pharaoh's heart, so that he would not 
let the children of Israel go." After the plague 
of the darkness, it is said, verse 24. "And Pha- 
raoh called unto Moses, and said, Go ye, serve 
the Lord." Verse 27. "But the Lord hardened 
Pharaoh's heart, and he would not let them go." 
Here it appears that the reason why Pharaoh did 
not let them go, was, that the Lord hardened his 
heart, and caused him to refuse. Chap. 11. 9, 10. 
"And the Lord said unto Moses, Pharaoh shall 
not hearken unto you ; that my wonders may be 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 53' 

multiplied in the land of Egypt, And Mose& 
and Aaron did all these wonders before Pharaoh • 
and the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart, so that 
he would not let the children of Israel go out of 
his land." After the death of the first-bom, it is 
said, chap. 12. 30,, 31. " And Pharaoh rose up in 
the night, and he called for Moses and Aaron by 
night, and said, Rise up, and get you forth from 
among my people." Verse 33, ''And the Egyp- 
tians were urgent upon the people, that they 
might send them out of the land in haste ; for 
they said, we be all dead men," But the Lord 
said to Moses, chap. 14. 4. "I will harden Pha- 
raoh's heart, that he shall follow after them; and 
I will be honored upon Pharaoh, and upon all 
his host." Verse 5. "And the heart of Pharaoh, 
and of his servants, w r as turned against the people." 
Compare this with Ps. 105. 25, and it will appear 
that it was God who turned their heart against his 
people. Verse 8. "And the Lord hardened the 
heart of Pharaoh, king of Egypt, and he pur- 
sued after the children of Israel." When they 
came to the Red Sea, God said to Moses, verse 
15. "Speak unto the children of Israel, that they 
go forward:" verse 17. "And I, behold, I will 
harden the hearts of the Egyptians, and they 
shall follow them ; and I will get me honor upon 
Pharaoh, and upon all his host, upon his chariots, 
and upon his horsemen." Verse 31. "And Israel 
saw that great work which the Lord did upon the 



54 



DIVINE AGENCY. 



Egyptians ; and the people feared the Lord, and 
believed the Lord and his servant Moses." It has 
been said that God did nothing to Pharaoh's heart, 
but only withdrew his restraints. But if the lan- 
guage which God uses, when speaking of it, does 
not express a positive and powerful agency, it 
would be difficult to find any language that could. 
And those who make the objection are so sensible 
that this is the natural and obvious meaning of the 
words, that when they speak on the same subject, 
they very carefully avoid the language which God 
uses, and express themselves in softer terms. But 
if our sentiments lead us to reject and condemn 
the language which God uses, we have reason to 
conclude that our sentiments are wrong. It can- 
not be said that this case of Pharaoh was a singu- 
lar one, and that God does not deal in this manner 
with other men ; for the Psalmist says, Ps. 33. 
13, 15. "The Lord looketh from heaven; he 
beholdeth all the sons of men. He fashioneth 
their hearts alike." That is, as the Septuagint 
has it, "He fashioneth their hearts each one." 
God makes every man's heart what it is. With 
respect to Sihon, the agency of God is expressed, 
if possible, in still stronger terms. Deut. 2. 30. 
"But Sihon, king of Heshbon, would not let us 
pass by him ; for the Lord thy God hardened his 
spirit, and made his heart obstinate." No one, it 
is thought, will say that this obstinacy of heart 
was not wickedness of heart. But God "made 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 



00 



his heart obstinate;' With respect to the kings 
of the Canaanites, whom Joshua destroyed, it is 
said, Josh. 11. 20. "For it was of the Lord to 
harden their hearts, that they should come against 
Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utter- 
ly, and that they might have no favor." The 
apostle, after quoting the case of Pharaoh to illus- 
trate God's general method of dealing with his 
creatures, draws this conclusion, Rom. 9. 18. 
"Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will 
have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." 
He teaches the same truth also in the simile of 
the potter and the clay, verse 21, "Hath not the 
potter power over the clay, of the same lump to 
make one vessel unto honor, and another unto 
dishonor?" The potter forms his vessels, and 
fits them for the various uses for which he de- 
signs them. One vessel he designs for an honor- 
able use, and he forms it such as to be fit for that 
use. Another he designs for a dishonorable use*, 
and he forms it such as to be fit for that use. If 
this comparison is in point, the apostle teaches us. 
that God not only designs one to be a "vessel of 
mercy," and another to be a "vessel of wrath," 
but actually forms them such as to be fit for these 
uses. That is, he forms their characters, by caus- 
ing one to perform holy actions, and so making 
him holy, and fitting him for glory, and causing 
another to perform wicked actions, and so mak- 
ing him a sinner, and fitting him for destruction. 



56 



DIVINE AGENCY 



The same truth is also taught in those scriptures' 
which represent God as blinding the mind, clos- 
ing the eyes, giving the spirit of slumber, deceiv- 
ing and deluding men. This blindness is alto- 
gether the blindness of the heart. It is wholly 
criminal. It is nothing but wilful wickedness. 
Any other blindness would not answer the pur- 
pose for which this is evidently designed, that is, 
to fit them for destruction. Isa. 6. 9, 10. "And 
he said, Go and tell this people, Hear ye indeed, 
but understand not ; and see ye indeed, but per- 
ceive not. Make the heart of this people fat, and 
make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes ; lest 
they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, 
and understand with their heart, and convert, and 
be healed." Alluding to this passage, John says, 
chap. 12. 39, 40. "Therefore they could not be- 
lieve, because that Esaias said again, He hath 
blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that 
they should not see with their eyes, nor understand 
with heir heart, and be converted, and I should 
heal them." And the apostle says, Rom. 11. 7, 
8. "And the rest were blinded, according as it is 
written, God hath given them the spirit of slum- 
ber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that 
they should not hear, unto this day." Respecting 
Egypt, it is said, Isa. 19. 13, 14. "The princes of 
Zoan are become fools, the princes of Noph are 
deceived. The Lord hath mingled a perverse 
spirit in the midst thereof." To the Jews, the 
5 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 



57 



prophet says, Isa. 29. 10. "The Lord hath poured 
out upon you the spirit of deep sleep, and hath 
closed your eyes ; the prophets and your rulers, 
the seers hath he covered." Respecting the 
false prophets, God says, Ezek. 14. 9. "If the 
prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing*, 
I the Lord have deceived that prophet ; and I will 
stretch out my hand upon him, and will destroy 
him." Job says to God, chap. 17. 4. "For thou 
hast hid their heart from understanding: there- 
fore shalt thou not exalt them.'"' Again, he says, 
chap. 12. 6, &c. "The tabernacles of robbers 
prosper, and they that provoke God are secure ; 
into whose hand God bringeth abundantly. Who 
knoweth not in all these that the hand of the 
Lord hath wrought this ? With him is strength 
and wisdom: the deceived and the deceiver are 
his. Fie leadeth counsellors away spoiled, and 
inaketh the judges fools. He removeth away the 
speech of the trusty, and taketh away the under- 
standing of the aged. He taketh away the heart 
of the chief of the people of the earth, and caus- 
eth them to wander in a wilderness where there 
is no way. They grope in the dark without 
light, and he maketh them, to stagger like a 
drunken man."' The royal preacher says, Eccl. 
3. 10, 11. "I have seen the travail which God 
hath given to the sons of men to be exercised in 
it. He hath made every thing beautiful in his 
time : also he hath set the world in their heart : 



58 



DIVINE AGENCY. 



so that no man can find out the work that God 
maketh, from the beginning to the end." To 
Ezekiel, chap. 20. 25, 26. God says, when 
speaking of his giving up the Jews to idolatry, 
" Wherefore I gave them also statutes that were 
not good, and judgments whereby they should 
not live: And I polluted them in their own gifts, 
in that they caused to pass through the fire all 
that openeth the womb, that I might make them 
desolate, to the end that they might know that I 
am the Lord." And the apostle says, II Thess* 
2. 11, 12. " For this cause God shall send them 
strong delusion, that they should believe a lie ; 
that they all might be damned, who believed not 
the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness." 

But the time would fail me to enumerate all the 
scripture evidence in favor of this important and 
fundamental doctrine of the gospel. The evi- 
dence already adduced is more than sufficient. 
Surely, if God "moves" men to do wickedly, as 
he did David, to number the people; if he "in- 
clines their hearts to evil," as the Psalmist prays 
he would not his; if he "stirs them up" to do 
wrong, as he did Hadad, and so many others ; if 
he "puts in their hearts" to commit sin, as he did 
in those of the kings of the earth to give their 
kingdom to the beast; if he "turns their hearts" 
to wickedness, as he did those of the Egyptians 
to hate his people; if he ''makes them to err 
from his ways," as he did the prophet and others j 



PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE. 



59 



if he declares that "he does" what the wicked 
are represented as doing, as in the case of the 
king of Assyria, and others; if he "blinds and 
hardens" them, as he did Pharaoh, and others ; 
if he "makes their hearts obstinate," as he did 
Sihon's; and "sets them one against another," as 
he did the Jews of old, according to the express 
declarations of scripture; there cannot be any 
doubt but that he works in men to will and do 
whatever they will and do, that he does, by his 
own agency, cause all their motions and actions, 
that he does "work all things after the counsel of 
his own will," 



SERMON IV. 



EPHESIAN3 I. 11. 

Who worketh all things after the counsel of his 
own will. 

Having shown that God has decreed, or fore- 
ordained, whatsoever comes to pass, and that he 
executes his decrees by his own agency, we come 
now, as was proposed, 

III. To attend to some objections which 
are made against this doctrine. 

Objection 1. It is said that this doctrine de- 
stroys free agency, and makes men machines ; 
that if God worketh all things, then creatures do 
not work any thing ; that if God, by his agency, 
causes every thing that takes place, then creatures 
have no agency at all, and God is the only agent 
in the universe. 

Answer. To understand this objection, and 
ascertain its force, it will be necessary to inquire 
what is a free agent, and what is a machine. A 
free agent is one who chooses, or wills. If an 
object is set before any being, and he exercises 



free agency. 



61 



choice respecting it, he is a free agent. A ma* 
chine has no will. It never chooses. The brute 
animals choose, and are therefore free agents, 
But they have no perception of right and wrong, 
and therefore, are not moral agents. Men have 
conscience, by which they feel the distinction 
between right and wrong, and are, therefore, free 
moral agents. The machines with which we are 
acquainted have no intelligence, no reason, and 
no conscience, as well as no will. They are not 
only incapable of choice, but incapable of per- 
ception too. A being, however, with intelligence, 
reason and conscience, would be a machine still, 
if he had no power of choosing. He could not 
be a free agent. Free agency, therefore, consists 
in choosing, and in nothing else. If any thing 
else is necessary to free agency, what is it ? Is 
it that our acts of choice should come to pass by 
chance, without any cause? Is a free agent one 
whose actions have no motive, are guided by no 
reason, and directed to no end? Is a free agent 
like one exposed in the open sea, upon a single 
plank, without compass, oar, or sail, the sport of 
winds and waves'? Such free agency no one can 
desire. If our actions come to pass by mere 
chance, without any cause, then intelligence, rea- 
son, and conscience, are worse than useless. It 
would be better to be a machine, in the hands of 
a wise and benevolent artist It would be better 
to be a senseless block, than to be thus the sport 



62 



OBJECTIONS, 



of mere blind contingence, and have intelligence, 
reason, and conscience, to aggravate our misery. 
But this supposition is impossible, for nothing 
comes into existence without a cause. Is it 
necessary, then, to our free agency, that we 
should cause our own acts of choice % This is 
the ground usually taken by those who deny the 
doctrine which has been supported in these dis- 
courses. Let us, then, examine it carefully. It 
is thought that we cause our own acts of choice, 
and that no one can be a free agent unless he 
does so ; and consequently, that if God should 
cause our acts of choice, it would destroy our 
free agency. Perhaps, however, it can be shown 
that it is not essential to free agency that we should 
cause our own acts of choice ; and not only so, 
but that it is impossible we should cause them, 
impossible in the very nature of things. It wall 
be admitted by all, that God is a free agent. If 
any being in the universe acts freely, it must be 
that God does. He is infinite in power, and there 
is no superior being to lay him under any re- 
straints. God, then, is a perfect free agent. If, 
therefore, it is necessary to free agency that a 
being should cause his own acts of choice, God 
must cause his. But this he does not do. His 
acts of choice have no cause, for they are eternal. 
By acts of choice, are here meant determinations, 
those acts of the mind which are confined within 
the mind itself, and not external operations: and 



FREE AGENCY. 



63 



by cause, is meant the efficient or producing cause, 
and not the reason or motive. God's determina- 
tions have a reason, but not a cause. They are 
all eternal. But the producing cause must exist 
before the effects which it produces. Therefore, 
the producing cause of God's eternal determina- 
tions must have existed before eternity, which is 
absurd. Consequently, the divine determinations 
have no cause. To deny that the divine deter- 
minations are eternal, is to deny that God is im- 
mutable; it is saying God is not "in one mind," 
as the scriptures say he is. And if he changes 
his mind, and makes new determinations, it is 
because he discovers some new reasons for his 
new determinations, which he did not know be- 
fore. That is, he did not know al] things from 
eternity. But this makes God a very imperfect, 
ignorant, changeable being. It makes him no 
God at all ; it is blank atheism. He, therefore, 
did know all things from eternity, and never sees 
any reason to change his determinations, which 
have always been the same from eternity. The 
divine determinations, therefore, being all eternal, 
cannot have a cause, any more than the being of 
God can have a cause. Since, therefore, God 
does not cause his own determinations, or acts of 
choice, and God is a free agent, it follows that a 
being may be a free agent without causing his 
own acts of choice. But it is not only unneces- 
sary for u§ to cause our own acts of choice, in 



64 OBJECTIONS. 

order to be free agents, but it is impossible that 
we should cause them. In what way can we 
cause them ? If we do it, we must do it volun- 
tarily or involuntarily, that is, intentionally or 
unintentionally. Do we do it involuntarily, that 
is, without intending it? But if we do it without 
intending it, there is no free agency in that. 
Whatever we do involuntarily, we do as ma- 
chines ; or rather, it is not we that do it at all. 
Do we, then, cause our own acts of choice volun- 
tarily ? Do we do it by intending to do it? But 
to say we intend to do it, is the same as to say, 
we determine to do it, we choose to do it. Do we, 
then, cause an act of choice, by choosing to put it 
forth? Do we choose to choose ? Here, then, 
are two acts of choice, by one of which we caused 
the other. But what caused the first of them ? 
Did we cause that, by choosing it? There is no 
other way in which we could cause it. Did we 
choose to choose to choose ? Here, then, are 
three acts of choice, the first causing the second, 
and the second causing the third. But what 
caused the first ? Did we cause that by a pre- 
vious choice, and that previous choice by another 
previous to it, and so on ? What, then, caused 
the first in the whole series ? Did we cause that? 
If we caused that, it must have been by choosing 
or willing it. That is, we caused our first act of 
choice by another previous to it, or by one before 
the first, which is absurd. It is, therefore, impos- 



FREE A3ENCT. 



65 



sible in the nature of things, for any being to 
cause his own acts of choice. And consequently ,- 
free agency does not consist in causing our own 
acts of choice. But it consists simply in choos- 
ing. If an object is presented to our minds, and 
we exercise choice respecting it, we are free 
agents, and it is impossible for any being in the 
universe to be more so. The doctrine supported 
in these discourses, is, that God causes us to 
choose. But free agency consists in choosing. 
Therefore, if God causes us to choose, he causes 
us to be free agents. To destroy our free agency, 
and make us machines, he must cause us not to 
choose. This doctrine, therefore, is so far from 
destroying free agency, that it is the very thing 
which secures it. There is no liberty possible or 
conceivable greater than of acting voluntarily. 
But when God causes us to choose, he causes us 
to act voluntarily. When God causes us to 
choose, therefore, he causes us to enjoy and exer- 
cise the greatest liberty that is possible for any 
being iu the universe, the greatest liberty that can 
be desired, or that can be conceived. The doc- 
trine w r hich has been supported in these dis- 
courses, therefore, is so far from infringing upon 
the doctrine of free agency, that the doctrine of 
free agency rests upon it, as upon a foundation 
that cannot be shaken. 

But some say, that, if God causes us to choose, 
then it is God's choice, and not ours ; we have no 



66 



OBJECTIONS. 



choice at all. It is God in us that wills and does, 
loves and hates, and performs all our actions, and 
we do nothing. Let us ask any such person 
whether he breathes. Do you breathe, or not? 
You certainly do. But God causes you to 
breathe. And it is not God's breath, but your 
own. And God's causing you to breathe, has no 
tendency to stop you from breathing, but the con- 
trary. "God causes you to live; but this does 
not destroy your life. God causes you to move, 
but this does not hinder nor destroy your motion. 
So, God causes you to will or choose; but this 
does not destroy your willing or choosing," or 
make your choice any the less your own. When 
God works in us to will and to do, we as really 
will and do, as God does. We act, while we are 
acted upon. God's agency is the cause of our 
agency. God's choice the cause of our choice. 
But the cause and the effect are distinct things, 
and ought not to be confounded. And those who 
intend to reason fairly, will not endeavor to con- 
found them. The scriptures also abundantly 
teach the consistency of these two doctrines ; and 
while they ascribe to God an agency in causing 
all the actions of men, they speak of those actions 
as truly and properly the actions of men. Ac- 
cording to them, it is God that gives repentance, 
while it is man that repents. It is God that gives 
faith, while it is man that believes. It is God 
that causes man to walk in his statutes, while it 



BLAME WORTHINESS. 



67 



is man that walks in God's statutes. And it is 
man that works out his own salvation, while it is 
God that works in him both to will and to do of 
his good pleasure. Phil. 2. 12, 13. 

Objection 2. It is said, that if this doctrine is 
true, then men cannot be to blame for any thing 
they do ; that if God causes them to act as they 
do, in every instance, it is impossible they should 
be sinful ; that if God moves them to commit that 
wickedness for which he punishes them, they are 
proper objects of pity, but cannot be criminal. 

Answer. To give this objection any weight, 
one of two things must be taken for granted, 
either that we cannot act while acted upon, and 
so exercise no choice, or else that the blame wor- 
thiness does not lie in the nature of the choice it- 
self, but in its cause. It is true that we must will 
or choose, in order to be blame worthy ; and if 
the doctrine supported in these discourses destroys 
our willing or choosing, it destroys our blame 
worthiness. And if the blame worthiness lies in 
the cause of the choice, and not in the choice it- 
self, and God is the cause of our choice, it is 
equally true that no blame will attach to us. But 
if both these grounds for the objection can be re- 
moved, the objection will be answered. Does, 
then, the agency of God destroy our agency? 
When God causes us to choose, does that prevent 
our choosing? When God works in us to will 
and do, does that hinder our willing or doing 1 ? 
6 



68 



OBJECTIONS. 



When God exerts his influence upon us, to make 
us act, do we not, under that influence, as really 
act, as any being in the universe 2 When God 
by his agency causes us to choose, we choose, as 
really as we breathe when God causes us to 
breathe, and the choice is our own. If, then, the 
criminality of an act of choice does not belong to 
us, it must be because the blame worthiness does 
not lie in the choice, but in its cause. But to say 
that the blame worthiness lies in the cause of the 
choice, and not in the nature of the choice itself, 
involves many absurdities. It is contrary to com- 
mon sense. It is a dictate of common sense, that 
the quality of a thing lies in the nature of the 
thing itself, and not at all in any thing else. A 
murderous spirit is a bad spirit. It is odious in 
its own nature. And every good man abhors it, 
without waiting to inquire after its cause. And 
let its cause be what it may, that does not alter 
the nature of the thing itself, or render it any the 
less deserving of abhorrence. Serpents and toads 
are poisonous animals, and in themselves odious 
and disagreeable creatures. And God's having 
created them, does not alter their nature, or render 
them any the less disagreeable in themselves. 
And their disagreeable qualities lie wholly in 
them, and not at all in God, the cause of them. 
When we inquire into the moral conduct of others, 
we always direct our inquiry to the nature of the 
choice itself, to the disposition of heart with which 



BLAME WORTHINESS. 



69 



any thing was done, to the design or intention of 
the doer. And having satisfied ourselves on that 
head, we condemn or acquit accordingly, without 
any further inquiry. The common sense of every 
man, therefore, teaches that the blame worthiness 
lies in the nature of the choice itself and not at 
all in its cause. But to say that the blame wor- 
thiness lies in the cause of the choice, is also at- 
tended with this absurdity, that it drives all blame 
worthiness out of the universe, or else fixes it all 
upon God, even though the doctrine advanced in 
these discourses should not be true. It takes 
away the blame from us, as much if we cause our 
own choice, as it does if God causes it. If we 
cause our own choice, we must do it voluntarily 
or involuntarily. Do we do it involuntarily? If 
so, no blame can attach to us : for the blame wor- 
thiness does not lie in the choice, but in its cause, 
and its cause is something perfectly involuntary. 
But to blame us for any thing perfectly involun- 
tary, is absurd. No man ever feels to blame for 
any thing perfectly involuntary. Besides, if we 
cause an act of ehoice by an involuntary exertion, 
\\f there could be any such thing,) that exertion 
must hare some cause too, and that cause must 
have a previous cause, and that previous cause 
another previous to it, and so on. And thus, as 
we go backward in the chain of causes, we carry 
all the blame worthiness, from step to step, till we 
come back to the first cause. Bui the first cause 



ro 



OBJECTIONS. 



of all things is God. This course, then, removes 
all the blame from us to God, as much as if he 
caused our choice immediately by his own agency. 
Will it be said, then, that we cause our own choice 
voluntarily, that we choose to choose'? Thisbring3 
us back to a choice before the first. And all the 
blame belongs to that choice which was before 
the first; which drives it out of the universe. 
Will it be said, then, that the cause of our choice 
is some mysterious power in us, which produces 
it without any exertion, voluntary or involuntary? 
The blame of a particular choice, then, is trans- 
ferred from the choice to this power, which is its 
eause. But it does not rest there, for that power 
must have some cause, and the blame must be 
transferred to the cause of that power, and so on 
again, from step to step, till we come back to the 
first cause, which brings it again to God. If it is 
said that we are the proper cause of our own 
choice, without pointing out any way in which 
we cause it, the result will be the same. If we 
are the cause, the blame is transferred from the 
choice to us ; but it cannot rest on us, for we have 
a cause too. And thus, whatever course we take, 
this principle, that the blame belongs to the cause 
of the choice, and not to the choice itself, removes 
all the blame from us, and from every thing which 
is an effect, and either drives it out of the uni- 
verse, or brings it back to God, the first cause of 
all things. If to avoid this absurdity, it should 



BLAME WORTHINESS. 71 

be said that our choice has no cause, the difficulty 
will still remain. For if the blame belongs to 
the cause, and our choice has no cause, the blame 
belongs no where. But every one feels that there 
is blame worthiness somewhere, and that it does 
not belong to God, but to the creature. The 
blame worthiness, therefore, does not lie in the 
cause of the choice, but in the nature of the 
choice itself. And since we really choose, and 
our choice is our own. and the blame worthiness 
lies in the nature of the choice itself, the blame 
belongs entirely to us. let the cause of our choice 
be what it may When God works in us to will 
and do, we really will and do, as much as if we 
were independent. Our actions are our own, and 
the criminality of them, if they are wrong, be- 
longs entirely to us. And this every one feels, 
in his own breast, however some pretended phil- 
osophers have endeavored to persuade themselves 
to the contrary. Every one feels, in his own 
breast, that when he acts voluntarily, he is a pro- 
per subject of praise or blame, according as his 
actions are right or wrong, If he voluntarily 
does that which he knows he ought not, he is con- 
demned of his own conscience, and all the meta- 
physical subtleties in the world cannot make him 
feel that he is not to blame. God u moved' ' David 
to number Israel: but David said, <; I have sinned 
greatly in that I have done : and now I beseech 
thee, O Lord, take away the iniquity of thy ser- 



72 



OBJECTIONS 



vant; for I have done very foolishly." He was 
conscious of doing wickedly, and God's having 
moved him to do as he had done, did not in the 
least degree diminish his guilt and desert of pun- 
ishment, in God's view or his own : and he was 
punished in a terrible manner by the pestilence, 
God hardened the heart of Pharaoh, that he 
should not let his people go ; but when he pun- 
ished him for refusing to let them go, Pharaoh 
said, "The Lord is righteous, and I and my peo- 
ple are Avicked. I have sinned against the Lord 
your God, and against you." Pharaoh did not 
feel any the less guilty, because God had hard- 
ened his heart, and caused him to do these things. 
And God did not consider him any the less guilty, 
but punished him in a most exemplary manner. 
Judas felt guilty, when he had betrayed his Lord, 
though he did neither more nor less than was be- 
fore "determined" and "written" of him. Peter 
felt guilty, when he had denied his master, though 
it was not only decreed before hand that he should 
do so, but Peter knew it before hand, for our Lord 
had told him that he would deny him. And God 
every where in scripture considers and treats per- 
sons as guilty, when doing things in themselves 
improper, though they are acting under his de- 
cree and agency. "He turned the heart" of the 
Egyptians "to hate his people, and to deal subtlely 
with his servants," Ps. 105. 25, but he punished 
them for their wickedness in so doing. He "put 



BLAME WORTHINESS. 



n 



in the hearts" of the kings of the earth "to agree 
and give their kingdom unto the beast," but he 
punished them for so doing, as appears from the 
context. He made use of the king of Assyria, 
as "the rod of his anger," to chastise a wicked 
people, and represents himself as employing his 
own agency, in the use of this instrument, as 
really as the man does, who moves a saw, an axe, 
or a rod, with his hand/ But, nevertheless, God 
considers him as guilty, and says, Isa. 10. 12, 
"Wherefore, it shall come to pass, that when the 
Lord hath performed his whole work upon mount 
Zion and on Jerusalem, I will punish the fruit of 
the stout heart of the king of Assyria, and the 
glory of his high looks." God "stirred up" the 
neighboring nations to come against Israel and 
Judah, and then sent the king of Babylon to de- 
stroy them for their wickedness in so doing ; and 
then he "stirred up" the Medes and Persians to 
punish Babylon. Indeed, from the whole tenor 
of the scripture history, it is evident, that it is 
God's usual manner, to make use of the ambition, 
pride and cruelty of one nation, to punish the 
same wickedness in another; and when he has 
done so, to punish the instrument of his vengeance 
in the same manner. And this method of divine 
administration meets the approbation of the in- 
habitants of heaven. For when John saw in 
vision the third angel pour out his vial upon the 
rivers and fountains of waters, which turned them 



74 



OBJECTIONS. 



to blood, denoting the terrible slaughter of the 
enemies of the church, by each other's hands, he 
says, Rev. 16. 5, 6. "And I heard the angel of the 
waters say, Thou art righteous, O Lord, which 
art, and wast, and shalt be, because thou hast 
judged thus; for they have shed the blood of 
saints and prophets, and thou hast given them 
blood to drink; for they are worthy." And thus, 
reason, scripture, common sense, and the con- 
science of every man, agree in declaring, that 
men are guilty and deserving of punishment, not- 
withstanding they act under the decree of God, 
and do no more than what he causes them to do 
by his powerful agency. 

There are some also, who make this objection 
against the doctrine supported in these discourses, 
who answer it themselves, and maintain the very 
principles against which they bring the objection. 
For they admit that God causes all the good ac- 
tions of his creatures. They agree with us in 
saying, that God works in the saints to will and 
to do, of his good pleasure. But free agency is 
as necessary to holiness as it is to sin. A ma- 
chine cannot be holy, any more than it can be 
sinful. If, then, God works in the saints to will 
and to do that which is right, and they are holy, 
he may work in the wicked to will and to do that 
which is wrong, and they be sinful. If God's 
agency does not destroy the agency of the saints, 
it does not destroy the agency of sinners. If, 



HARDENING THE HEART. 



75 



while God works in the saints to will and do, they 
can do that which is praise worthy, and accept- 
able in the sight of God ; then, while God works 
in sinners to will and to do, they can do that 
which is blame worthy, and deserving of punish- 
ment. And thus, many of those who make the 
objection destroy it themselves. 

Objection 3. It is said, that the scriptures rep- 
resent sinners as hardening their own hearts, fit- 
ting themselves for the day of wrath, and effect- 
ing their own destruction. But this doctrine rep- 
resents God as hardening their hearts, and fitting 
them for destruction. And therefore, this doctrine 
is contrary to the scriptures. 

Answer. It is true that the scriptures represent 
sinners as hardening their own hearts, destroying 
themselves, and the like. But this objection takes 
it for . granted that the agency of God and the 
agency of the creature cannot both be employed 
about the same thing, when the doctrine supported 
in these discourses is, that they are both employed 
about the same thing. One passage of scripture 
declares that Pharaoh hardened his own heart, 
and another passage declares that God hardened 
his heart. Both are true, and they are perfectly 
consistent with each other. For, it does not fol- 
low, because Pharaoh hardened his own heart, 
that therefore God did not harden it, nor because 
God hardened his heart, that therefore Pharaoh 
did not harden his own heart. The doctrine sup- 



76 



OBJECTIONS. 



ported in these discourses is, that we act, while 
acted upon ; that when God causes us to choose, 
we choose ; that when God works in us to will 
and do, we will and do ; that when God hardens 
our heart, we harden our own heart; that when 
God fits us for destruction, by causing us to do 
those things which will render us proper objects 
of his wrath, we fit ourselves for destruction by- 
doing those things. The objection, therefore, is 
not made against our doctrine, but against some- 
thing which is totally different from it. 



SERMON V. 



EPHESIANS J. tl. 

Who worketh all things after the counsel of his 
oivn will. 

We proceed in the discussion of objections. 

Objection 4. It is said, that if this doctrine is 
true, and God decrees and causes whatever takes 
place, then men cannot possibly help doing as 
they do, in all cases. And so, if they are finally 
damned, they are damned for doing what they 
cannot help. And when God requires them to do 
otherwise than they do, he requires an impossi- 
bility; which is manifestly unjust and cruel. 

Answer. It is granted that to punish men for 
doing what they cannot help, or to require of 
them an impossibility, would be manifestly unjust 
and cruel. But this God does not do. He re- 
quires no more of men than they are able to per- 
form; and he punishes them only for doing those 
things which they could and ought to have ab- 
stained from doing. When we speak, in common 
language, of ability and inability, can and cannot. 



78 



OBJECTIONS. 



possible and impossible, we always have reference 
to men's powers and faculties of body or mind, 
and not at all to their inclinations. If a man has 
all the powers and faculties of body and mind 
which are necessary to do a thing, we say he is 
able to do it, whether he is willing or not. His 
ability and his willingness are different things, 
perfectly distinct. A man may be able to per- 
form a piece of work, which he has no heart 
to perform, and which he is totally unwilling 
to engage in. And again, a man may be per- 
fectly willing to do that which is not in his 
power, that which is entirely beyond his strength. 
One man may be able to march to the field of 
battle, but totally unwilling. And another may 
be perfectly willing to march to the field of blood, 
but through bodily infirmity may be unable. 
Ability and willingness must both unite in the 
same person, before he will perform any thing, 
but they are perfectly distinct, and our willing- 
ness constitutes no part of our ability. It is true 
that willingness is sometimes styled moral ability ; 
but it is evidently in a figurative and improper 
sense. According to the usual and proper mean- 
ing of the term, men are able to do every thing 
which they have bodily and mental strength suffi- 
cient to do, whether they are willing to exert that 
strength, and do the thing or not. Now, although 
God cannot justly require of men more than they 
are able to do, that is, more than they have bodily 



INABILITY. 



n 



and mental strength sufficient to do, if they were 
so disposed: yet he may, and does, justly require 
of them many things which they have no disposi- 
tion to do, many things which they are totally tin- 
willing to pei form. And though men cannot be 
justly punished for not doing those things which 
they are unable to do, yet they may be justly 
punished for not doing those things which they 
are able, but are unwilling to do. Men are able 
to comply with the invitations of the gospel, that 
is, they have all the bodily and mental powers 
that are necessary to doit, and God may justly 
require them to do it, whether they are willing or 
not: and if they do not comply, he may justly 
punish them for their disobedience. And his 
making some willing and others unwilling, does 
not interfere with the ability of any. Those who 
are unwilling are just as able as those who are 
willing, and are as justly required to comply. To 
substantiate the objection, it must be made to 
appear, that God imposes some constraint upon 
men, so that they cannot do the things he requires, 
even though they are willing, and desirous of do- 
ing them. This is taken for granted in the objec- 
tion. This is the real meaning of the phrase, 
doing what they cannot help. The meaning is, 
that they desire and endeavor to do otherwise, but 
have not the necessary bodily and mental strength. 
If they had, they should do otherwise. They 
would, but cannot. But the fact is directly the 
7 



80 



OBJECTIONS. 



reverse. They can, but will not. They have 
the necessary bodily and mental strength, but 
have no willingness. And this, God is not bound 
to give them. Should any say, that God cannot 
justly require of men any more than he gives 
them a willingness to do, as well as bodily and 
mental strength, this would abolish all law, and 
destroy the distinction between right and wrong. 
For if God cannot require of men any more than 
he makes them willing,, as well as able, to do f 
then, since they always do what they have both 
strength and will to accomplish, he cannot justly 
require of them any more than they actually per- 
form. And if they always do all that he re- 
quires, there is no such thing as sin in the world. 
It is right, therefore, for God to require of them 
all that they have powers and faculties sufficient 
to perform, all that they are able to do; and if 
they fail of complying through unwillingnesss, it 
is right that they should be punished. But men 
have all the powers and faculties necessary to 
comply with the invitations of the gospel, and all 
the commands of God, and want nothing but a 
willingness. They can comply, but will not. 
"When, therefore, God punishes them for not com- 
plying, he punishes them, not for what they 
could not help, but solely for refusing to do what 
they could, but would not. 

Objection 5. It is said, that if this doctrine is 
true, and all events are infallibly decreed, then it 



USE OF MEANS. 



Si 



is in vain for us to use means to accomplish any 
event. If it is decreed that the event shall come 
to pass, it will come to pass, whether the means 
are used or not. If it is decreed that we shall be 
saved, we shall be saved, whether we use the 
means of salvation or not: and if it is decreed 
that we shall be damned, we shall be damned 4 
even though we should repent and believe the 
.gospel. 

Answer. To understand this objection fully, 
let us state it a Tittle more at large. Its language 
is if it is decreed that an event shall come to pass, 
it will come to pass, whether the means are used 
or not. If it is decreed that our life shall be pro- 
longed, it will be prolonged, though we should 
take no food. If it is decreed that we shall reap 
an abundant harvest of the fruits of the earth, we 
shall certainly do so, though we never sow our 
seed, or cultivate our fields. If it is decreed that 
we shall be to-morrow in a distant place, we shall 
certainly be there, though we never stir a step 
from home. If it is decreed that we shall go to 
our respective homes this day, we shall certainly 
go, though we never rise from our seats. If it 
was "determined" as the scripture says, that the 
Lord Jesus should be put to death on the cross, 
it would certainly have taken place, though he 
had never come into the world. This is the lan- 
guage of the objection. And surely, every one 
must perceive, from the very language of the ob- 



82 



OBJECTIONS, 



jection, that it is founded in a gross absurdity. It 
supposes that a thing can exist, and not exist, at 
the same time. It supposes that a whole can 
exist, without the existence of the parts of which 
it is composed. It supposes that a cause can 
exist, and operate, and produce its effect, and yet 
never exist at all. Nothing is means, which is 
not connected with the end, and necessary to 
bring it to pass. To say that the end can come 
to pass without the means, is to say that it can 
come to pass without that which is nec ssary to 
bring it to pass, which is a contradiction. To 
separate the end from the means, is to separate 
what are joined together in the very nature of 
things. If God has decreed the end, he has also 
decreed the means. That the end, although de- 
creed, cannot come to pass without the means, is 
plainly taught in the scriptures. It was decreed 
that Paul, and all that were with him in the ship, 
should be saved, when the ship was wrecked. 
Acts 27. 22 — 25. It was told him before hand 
that no man's life should be lost. But the end's 
being decreed, did not render the means unneces- 
sary. For when the sailors were about to flee 
out of the ship, and had let down the boat for that 
purpose, Paul says to the soldiers, verse 31, "Ex- 
cept these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved" 
Although it was decreed that the soldiers should 
be saved, yet the exertions of the sailors in the 
ship were necessary, as means to accomplish that 



USE OF MEANS. 



53 



end. And had the means been wanting, the end 
"could ?iot n have been attained, notwithstanding 
the decree. If, therefore, God has decreed the 
end, he has also decreed the means. If he has 
decreed that one man shall be saved, he has also 
decreed that he shall use the means of salvation. 
If he has decreed that another man shall be 
damned, he has also decreed that he shall use the 
means to be damned. To suppose that a man 
can be saved, without his using the means of sal- 
vation, is to make God a liar. The means of sal- 
vation are repentance for sin, and faith in Christ, 
which are always attended with the other chris- 
tian graces. To say that a man can be saved 
without repentance, is to contradict the declaration 
of God, which is, M Except ye repent, ye shall all 
likewise perish. 1 - To say that a man can be 
saved without faith in Christ, is to say, that "he 
that believeth not shall be saved," when God hath 
said, "He that believeth not shall be damned." 
Further, when any say, that if God has already 
unalterably decreed their eternal state, then they 
have no inducement to break of! their sins and 
lead a holy life, they betray, by this objection, 
the wickedness of their hearts. They discover 
that they love sin, and are unwilling to renounce 
it, that they hate holiness, and are unwilling to 
practise it; and if their eternal happiness is se- 
cure, they choose to continue in sin, and are de- 
termined to do so. Such may be certain that they 
7* 



84 



OBJECTIONS 



are in the gall of bitterness and bond of iniquity ; 
that they are using the means to be damned, and 
if mercy prevent not, they will be damned. Some 
say, that if they could believe this doctrine, they 
never would make any exertions to secure the 
salvation of their souls. But when they say 
this, besides betraying their love of sin, they are 
chargeable with the grossest absurdity. For, it 
is the same as to say, that if God has decreed that 
their repenting and believing the gospel shall se- 
cure the salvation of their souls, they never will 
repent and believe the gospel. The doctrine, 
however, which is supported in these discourses, 
is so far from discouraging the use of means, that 
all the encouragement we have to use means is 
derived from it. It is the disbelief of this doc- 
trine, that discourages the use of means. Tf God 
has not, by his decrees, established a connection 
between means and ends, where is the encourage- 
ment to use means? There is none. If there is 
no such connection, the end is no more likely to 
come to pass with means, than it is without them. 
If God has established no connection between 
means and ends, the man who ploughs his field 
and sows his seed, is no more likely to reap a 
harvest, than he who does neither. If God has 
established no connection between means and 
ends, he that remains perfectly inactive is as like- 
ly to accomplish all his desires, as he who exerts 
himself with the greatest diligence. And who,. 



tlsfc OF MfeANS, 



85 



nh this supposition, would make any exertions I 
Who would use any means, if he did not suppose 
there was some connection between them and the 
end he had in view ? To deny the decrees of 
God, then, which form this connection, is to de- 
stroy effectually all encouragement to the use of 
means. But if God, by his decrees, has estab- 
lished a connectiun, and the end is more likely to 
be attained by means than without them, then 
there is encouragement to use means. And the 
stronger this connection is, the greater is the en- 
couragement. If this connection is infallible, 
and the end certainly follows from the means, 
then there is the same inducement to use means 
that there is to obtain the end. If we have rea- 
son to conclude God has decreed that our taking 
food shall prolong our lives, we shall have as 
strong inducement to take food, as we have to 
prolong our lives. If we have reason to con- 
clude God has decreed that our repenting and be- 
lieving the gospel shall secure the salvation of 
our souls, we shall have the same inducement to 
repent and believe the gospel, that we have to 
secure the salvation of our souls. And if we 
have reascn to believe that God has decreed both 
the means and the end, and established a firm 
connection between them, then, if we find our- 
selves disposed to use the means, we may depend 
with certainty that the end will follow 7 , and shall 
have all the encouragement possible to proceed 



86 



OBJECTIONS. 



in the use of them with diligence and alacrity, 
Objection 6> It is said, that this doctrine makes 
Gqd the author of sin ; and to make God the 
author of sin, is such dreadful blasphemy, that it 
ought not to be thought, much less to be openly 
taught and defended. 

Answer. This has been thought to be an ob- 
jection of great force. It is apprehended, how- 
ever, that its force consists merely in its sound. 
It is believed that when the meaning of the ob- 
jection can be ascertained, and ideas are attended 
to, instead of sounds, the objection will vanish. 
What, then, is the meaning of the objection? 
Does it mean that the doctrine supported in these 
discourses makes God the actor of sin? Or does 
it mean, that it makes God employ his agency in 
the production of sinful actions, in such a man- 
ner as he ought not to employ it? Or does it 
mean, that it makes God employ his agency in 
the production of effects, which are, on the whole, 
undesirable, and not for the general good ? If 
the objection means any of these, it is believed 
that it does not lie against the doctrine we have 
supported. And if it does not mean any of these, 
it is difficult to conceive what it can mean, to be 
an objection in the mind of any one. 

When the objector says, then, that this doctrine 
makes God the author of sin, does he mean that 
it makes God the actor of sin ? The term author 
often conveys the idea of doing, performing, or 



AUTHOR OF SIN. 



87 



acting ; as we sometimes say, such a man was 
the author of a crime, when we mean, he was the 
actor, the doer, the perpetrator of it. To say 
that God is the author of sin, in this sense, would, 
indeed, be blasphemy. It would be saying that 
God is a sinner. But the doctrine supported in 
these discourses does not make God the author 
of sin in this sense. In this sense of the term 
author, every one is the author of his own sin. 
When God works in us to will and do any thing, 
we are the doers of that thing. When God 
causes us to choose, it is we that choose. When 
God causes us to w-alk, it is we that walk. When 
God "turned the heart" of the Egyptians "to hate 
his people," it was the Egyptians, and not God, 
that hated his people. In like manner, if he 
causes men to commit a sin, they are the commit- 
ters, the doers, the perpetrators, of that sin, and 
not -God. If this is what the objector means by 
the pjirnse, author of sin, God is not the author 
of sin, in any such sense, and the doctrine sup- 
ported in these discourses does not make him so. 

Does the objector, then, by the term author 
mean nothing more than the cause, and suppose 
that God cannot cause the sinful actions of men, 
without bringing a reproach upon his character? 
If this is true, it must be because he cannot cause 
the sinful actions of men without exercising an 
improper agency, or because he cannot be a cause 
of the sinful actions of men without having sin ia 



88 



OBJECTIONS. 



himself, or because he cannot cause the sinful ac- 
tions of men without causing the existence of 
something which had better be kept out of ex- 
istence. 

Is it true, then, that God cannot cause the sin- 
ful actions of men, without exercising an impro- 
per agency, and doing something which brings a 
reproach upon his character? This has been 
sometimes thought, and in support of it, it may be 
said, that it would evidently be wrong in us to use 
our influence to make any one sin, and that Satan 
is chargeable with guilt in tempting us to sin, and 
therefore, that it must be wrong in God to 
cause us to commit sin. It is true that it is 
wrong in us, and in Satan, to use our influence to 
make others sin ; but it does not follow that it is 
therefore wrong in God to do so. We are charge- 
able with guilt for influencing others to commit 
sin, for two reasons. We do what we havens 
right to do, and we do it with a wicked intention. 
But God is not chargeable with guilt in causing 
us to commit sin, because he has a right to govern 
us, and because he does it with a good intention. 
God is our maker, and has, therefore, a right to 
dispose of us, as he sees fit. He is the governor 
of the universe, and has a right to make use of 
any of his creatures as instruments in administer- 
ing that government. If he sees that some wise 
and good purpose will be effected by the instru- 
mentality of some sin, which good cannot other- 



AUTHOR OF SIN, 89 

wise be attained, but which will be sufficient to 
overbalance the evil of that sin, it is right for 
him, as governor of the universe, to cause the 
commission of that sin, although it would not be 
right for any of the creatures to do so, because 
the government of the universe is not committed 
to their hands. If God saw that it was wisest 
and best that, his Son should be betrayed, mocked, 
condemned, and crucified ; if he saw that the sum 
of good in the universe would be greatly increased 
by the taking place of these events, it was right 
for him to cause Judas, and Herod, and Pilate, 
and the gentiles and people of Israel, "to do what- 
soever his hand and his counsel determined before 
to be done." If he saw that it was wisest and 
best that the kings of the earth should "agree and 
give their kingdom unto the beast," it was right 
for him to "put in their hearts" to do so. 

Is it true, then, that God cannot be a cause of 
the sinful actions of men, without having sin in 
himself? This has been sometimes said, and in 
support of it, it has been urged, that there can be 
nothing in the effect which is not in the cause. 
It has been said, that like produces like ; that it is 
impossible for a cause to produce an effect of a 
nature diametrically opposite to its own. It is 
true that every effect must have a cause which is 
adequate to its production ; but it by no means 
follows, that the effect and the cause must be of 
the same nature. God has produced matter, but 



90 



OBJECTIONS. 



it does not follow that God is a material being. 
God lias created toads and serpents, with all their 
poisonous qualities, but it does not follow that 
there is in God any thing like them. God has 
created a lake of fire and brimstone, for the pun- 
ishment of the wicked, but it does not follow that 
there is in God any thing of a similar nature. 
In like manner, although it should be said, that 
God produces sin, it would not follow that there 
was any thing like it in him. Indeed, those who 
say that there can be nothing in the effect which 
is not in the cause, are themselves the persons 
who make God a sinful being, for if sin can- 
not be the effect of any but a sinful cause, there 
can be no time when it began to exist. For, to 
say that sin began to exist, and yet it had a sinful 
cause, is to say, that there was sin before the first 
sin ; since the cause is before the effect. But if 
it never began to exist, it has existed from eter- 
nity; and since there is no eternal being but God, 
in which it could exist, this principle makes God 
an eternal sinner. But if sin began to exist, there 
was no sin in its cause. There was no sin in the 
cause of the first sin. God may, therefore, be the 
efficient or producing cause of the sinful actions 
of men, without implying that there is any sin in 
him. 

Does the force of the objection, then, consist in 
this, that the doctrine supported in these dis- 
courses makes God employ his agency in causing 



AUTHOR OF SIN. 



91 



the existence of something which had better be 
kept out of existence 1 If would indeed be a re- 
proach to the divine character, if God employed 
his agency in causing, or if he did not use it in 
preventing, the existence of any thing by which 
the highest interest of the universe would suffer. 
But he does not cause nor permit any thing to 
take place contrary to the general good. And 
till it can be proved, as it never can. that the 
great interests of the universe suffer by the sins 
which take place, there is no force in this objec- 
tion. But. as it has been proved, in the first of 
these discourses, that nothing takes place but 
what is, on the whole, for the best, nothing but 
what tends in some way to promote the highest 
happiness of the universe, for God to cause these 
things is not a matter of reproach, but of praise. 

Thus, it appears, that the doctrine supported in 
these discourses does not make God the actor of 
sin : it does not make him exercise any agency 
in producing the sinful actions of men but what 
is perfectly proper and suitable for him, as gover- 
nor of the universe : it does not make it necessary 
to suppose that there is any sin in him, or any 
imperfection in his nature: nor does it make him 
exercise an agency in the production of any 
events, but such as are, on the whole, wisest and 
best. And consequently, this doctrine does not 
make God the author of sin. in any sense which 
is in the least degree derogatory to the divine 
8 



92 



OBJECTIONS. 



character, or which brings the slightest reproach 
upon his name. 

NOTE. 

■ To remove the difficulty of God's being the cause of 
sin, it has been said, that sin is a mere want of holiness. 
And that since it is a mere negative thing, it cannot have 
any positive cause. And that although God causes our 
actions, he does not cause the sinfulness of them. But, it 
is apprehended, that there can be really no foundation for 
this distinction ; and if there were, it is not seen that any 
advantage is gained by it. How can the action of hating 
God, be. separated from the sin of it, so as to have a sepa- 
rate cause ? Can any thing be added to, or taken from 
hatred of God, so as to render it a holy exercise ? Can 
hatred of God be any thing but sin ? And if not, how 
can it be considered a mere negative thing, a non-entity, 
a nothing ? Is not hatred as really a positive exercise, as 
love is % How can the action of loving sin be abstracted 
from its moral qualities, so as to ; become harmless and in- 
nocent ? Is not loving sin, in itself a sin ? And is it not 
a positive thing, as really as loving God is a positive thing? 
How can these actions be produced, without producing sin'? 
But if this distinction were well founded, what advantage 
would be gained by it? If God causes all our actions, 
and also causes the goodness of good beings, which is ad- 
mitted, that being a positive thing, then, when he causes 
one to act, whom he has not made good, he causes him to 
act wickedly. And if he, by his agency, causes one to act 
wickedly, who, without that agency, would not act at all, 
why is not this liable to all the objections which can be 
brought against our doctrine, on the supposition that sin is 
a positive thing, and produced by divine power 1 



SERMON VL 



EPHESIANS I. 11. 

Who u-orketh all things after the counsel of his 
own icill. 

We proceed in the discussion of objections. 

Objection 7. It is said, that God, in scripture, 
represents sin as contrary to his will, and forbids 
it under the penalty of his severest indignation; 
but this doctrine represents sin as taking place 
agreeably to his will : and if God represents sin 
as contrary to his will and at the same time 
teaches this doctrine, he contradicts himself. It 
is said, that God, in scripture, expresses the great- 
est abhorrence of sin : but that, if he has decreed 
the existence of sin. and employs his own agency 
in causing it to take place, then he must be well 
pleased with sin ; and therefore, he expresses an 
abhorrence which he does not feel, and acts a de- 
ceitful part. It is said, that God, in scripture, 
says, that he wills not the death of the sinner; 
but that if this doctrine is true, he does will his 
death. And if he punishes his creatures for doing 



94 



OBJECTIONS. 



what he caused them to do, then he must delight 
in their misery : which represents God as a most 
wicked, false, cruel, and unfeeling tyrant. 

Answer. Before we proceed directly to the 
consideration of this objection, let a few things be 
premised. First, let it be observed, that in order 
to make out a contradiction in the declarations of 
any one, we must be certain that the words, which 
are supposed to contradict each other, are used, in 
both instances, in the same sense. For example, 
the scripture says, in one place, "Answer a fool 
according to his folly," and in another place, "An- 
swer not a fool according to his folly." Now, to 
make out a contradiction here, we must be certain 
that the words are used in both places in the same 
Sense; for if they are used in different senses, the 
two passages may be perfectly consistent. Again, 
let it be observed, that an event may, at one time, 
be considered by itself alone, and spoken of in 
that point of view, without taking into considera- 
tion any of its connections and consequences ; and 
it may, at another time, be considered, and spoken 
of, with all its connections, consequences, rela- 
tions, and dependencies. When spoken of in the 
former point of view, it is said to be spoken of as 
it is in itself considered ; and when spoken of in 
the latter point of view, it is said to be spoken of 
a& it is upon the whole, all things considered. 
Once more, let it be observed, that a thing may 
sometimes be chosen for its own sake, without any 



WILL OF GOD. 



95 



reference to any other thing; and this is what is 
called being desirable in itself.. As, for example, 
we choose happiness for its own sake, because it 
is desirable in itself. And again, a thing which 
is not desirable in itself, and which never could 
be chosen for its own sake, may be chosen for the 
sake of some other thing with which it is con- 
nected, and which may thereby be attained : and 
this is called being desirable on the whole. For 
instance, we may choose to suffer a small tempo- 
rary evil, for the sake of some great and lasting 
good, which may thereby be attained. We may 
choose to suffer the pain of cutting off one of our 
limbs, which is very undesirable in itself, for the 
sake of preserving our whole body from destruc- 
tion. A wise and good parent may choose to in- 
flict pain upon his undutiful child, not for its own 
sake, not because he delights in seeing his child 
suffer, for that is very undesirable in itself, but he 
chooses it for the sake of the child's good, or for 
the good of the rest of his family, to deter them 
from the like disobedience. God chose that his 
Son should die, not for its own sake, he had no 
pleasure in the sufferings of his Son, in them- 
selves considered, but he chose it for the sake of 
the salvation of sinners : he chose it, because, 
upon the whole, considering the amazing worth 
of souls, and the great glory that will redound to 
his name from saving sinners, considering how 
much his law would be honored, and how clearly 
8* 



96 



OBJECTION^. 



his hatred of sin would appear in the cross of 
Christ, all things being considered, he chose the 
death of his Son, as upon the whole a desirable 
event, though in itself considered nothing could be 
more undesirable. He chooses often to afflict his 
children in this world, not for its own sake, he 
does not delight in their sufferings, in themselves 
considered ; but he does it for their good, he does 
it because all things considered it is desirable, and 
will prepare them for a higher degree of happi- 
ness in heaven than they could otherwise enjoy. 
It must be evident that this distinction is well 
founded. For if it is not, if God gave up his 
Son to die, and "put him to grief," because he 
took pleasure in his sufferings, considered in 
themselves, if he afflicts his children in this world 
because he delights in their pain, he must be a 
malevolent being. But this is the character of 
Satan. Satan torments others because he delights 
in their misery in itself considered. This is pure 
malice, and cannot be ascribed to God. But if 
this distinction is well founded, as it certainly is, 
the way is prepared to remove the objection under 
consideration. 

For, with respect to the same event, we may be 
said without any contradiction, to will it, and not 
will it at the same time. It would indeed be a 
contradiction if we used the word will both times 
in the same sense, and with the same extent of 
signification; but we do not. We will it, in one 



WILL OF GOD. 



97 



sense, while, in another sense, we do not will it. 
We will it, in itself considered, while we do not 
will it, on the whole; or else we will it on the 
whole, while we do not will it in itself considered. 
We do not will the loss of one of our limbs, in 
itself considered, as in the case supposed above, 
while we do will its loss, on the whole, all things 
considered. The parent wills not the pain of his 
child, in itself considered, while he does will his 
pain on the whole, for the sake of its consequences. 
In like manner, God may be said to will a thing, 
and not will it, at the same time; that is, he does 
it in different senses. He willed not the death of 
his Son, in itself considered, while at the same 
time, all things considered, he did will his death. 
He wills not the affliction of his people, in itself 
considered; he takes no delight in their pain; 
while, at the same time, he does will their afflic- 
tion, on the whole, all things considered, and 
brings it upon them. 

Keeping this distinction in view, God may be 
said to will sin, and not will it, at the same time ; 
but in different senses. That is, he does not will 
it, in itself considered; it is in itself that abomina- 
ble thing which his soul hateth. But at the same 
time, when he sees that he can make a particular 
sin the occasion or means of some great good, 
which could not otherwise be accomplished, then 
he wills it to take place for the sake of that great 
good. It was in itself very undesirable that man 



98 



OBJECTIONS, 



should fall, and that sin should enter into the 
world; and consequently, God must, in itself con- 
sidered, have desired or willed that it should not 
take place. But when he considered that without 
this he could never display his wonderful mercy 
and grace in saving fallen man, which will fill 
all heaven with admiration and praise, ages with- 
out end, for the sake of this great good, he willed 
that man should fall. Or, if it should be said that 
God could not prevent man from sinning without 
destroying his moral agency, and that this was 
the reason he did not prevent it ; then it follows, 
that although in itself considered God willed that 
man should not sin, yet on the whole, rather than 
destroy his moral agency, he willed that man 
should sin. The sin of the betrayers and mur- 
derers of our Lord was in itself very undesirable, 
and so, in itself considered, God could not have 
willed it. But when he considered that without 
this no atonement could be made, and no sinner 
pardoned, for the scripture says, Hebrews 9r 22. 
"Without shedding of blood, is no remission;" 
when he considered that without this, all our 
fallen race must perish for ever, for the sake of 
the great good to be accomplished by it, he willed 
that men should betray and murder his Son. 
Thus, we see how God can be said, without any 
contradiction, to will sin and not will it, at the 
same time. He does it in different senses. He 
never wills it for its own sake, but for the sake of 



WILL OF GOD. 



99 



some great good which he will bring out of it. 
And that God wills sin, in this sense, does not 
imply that he feels any approbation towards sin 
in its own nature," or that he looks upon it with 
the least complacency, any more than it implies 
that we love pain, when we choose to endure it 
for the sake of sorae good. Neither does it imply 
that God is insincere in expressing the greatest 
abhorrence of sin. In itself, it is most odious 
and undesirable: and when God expresses an 
abhorrence of it, he expresses what he really 
feels. He hates it with all his heart. But this 
is no more inconsistent with his willing that it 
should take place, when he sees that some good 
can be attained by it, that will overbalance the 
evil, than it is inconsistent for us to do every day 
those things which are undesirable in themselves, 
for the sake of some good which we expect to 
accomplish by so doing. 

This distinction lays the foundation for another 
distinction, which must be made in order to recon- 
cile the scripture with itself, that of God's will of 
command, and will of decree. God has given us 
his will of command, as the rule of our conduct. 
Whatever is right in its own nature, he has com- 
manded. Whatever is wrong in its own nature, 
he has forbidden. It is right in its own nature, 
and desirable for its own sake, that all intelligent 
creatures should love God with all their hearts, 
and their fellow-creatures as themselves. This, 



100 OBJECTIONS. 

therefore, he has commanded. And all those 
things, in our external conduct, which are suita- 
ble expressions of this love, he has also com- 
manded. But, not to exercise this love, or to 
indulge any affection which is inconsistent with 
it, is wrong in its own nature ; it is in itself a 
very undesirable and wicked thing; and there- 
fore, God has forbidden it. It is also right in its 
own nature, and desirable for its own sake, that 
God should exercise the same disinterested, uni- 
versal, and impartial benevolence, which he re- 
quires of his creatures. And he does, exercise it. 
But our capacities and our circumstances are so 
different from, his, that what would be a suitable 
expression of that benevolence in God, would not 
be so in us. It is incumbent on all moral beings, 
to exercise the same benevolent affection, to be of 
the same holy temper. But their capacities and 
circumstances, their situations and. relations, are 
so various, that what would be a suitable expres- 
sion of that holy temper in one, would not be in 
another. What might be suitable for the father 
of a family to do, and would be in him an ex- 
pression of a right temper, might be very unsuita- 
ble for a child in that family to do, and might be 
in him an expression of a very different temper. 
The same external action, which would, in a 
magistrate, be an expression of a right disposi- 
tion, might, in a private citizen, be an evidence of 
a very wicked disposition. God has given us his 



WILL OF GOD. 101 

revealed will, in which he has pointed out what 
things are, in us, proper expressions of a holy- 
heart, and has commanded us to do those things, 
and forbidden the contrary. But for himself, be- 
ing placed in different circumstances, he has 
marked out, in his own mind, a different course 
of conduct, as in him a proper expression of the 
same holy heart. Being himself at the head of 
the universe, and possessing infinite power, and 
infinite wisdom, it is, in him, an expression of 
holy benevolence, to decree and cause those things 
to take place, which are upon the whole wisest 
and best. If he did not decree and cause those 
things to take place, which are, upon the whole, 
wisest and best, it would be an evidence of a want 
of goodness. God can discern what the greatest 
good of the universe requires, and bring it to pass. 
This, therefore, is the proper rule of his conduct ; 
and it is suitable for him to decree and cause those 
things, by T which this object will be best promoted. 
But we are placed in different circumstances, and 
cannot make this our rule of conduct, because we 
are not able to see before hand what will be, on 
the whole, for the greatest good of the universe. 
For us, therefore, to leave our proper sphere, and 
attempt to do those things which are God's pecu- 
liar prerogative, would be the height of arrogance 
and impiety. No ; what is right in itself, God's 
will of command, must be our rule of conduct; 
for the moment we depart from this rule, we 



102 



OBJECTIONS. 



manifest a wicked disposition; and we must leave 
it to God, to make what is best on the whole, and. 
his will of decree, his rule of conduct. It does 
not, therefore, imply any contradiction in God, for 
him to command us to do what is right in itself, 
while he himself determines that he will do what 
is best on the whole. It is wrong in itself, that 
men should commit murder ; and for them to do 
it, is an expression of a wicked disposition ; and 
therefore, God has forbidden it But, it was best 
on the whole, that his Son should be murdered 
by wicked men, best that in that way an atone- 
ment should be made for sin. Therefore, it was 
proper for God to decree and cause that his Son 
should be "taken, and b} r wicked hands be cruci- 
fied and slain;" (Acts 2. 23.) and his doing so, 
is in him an expression of a holy disposition. It 
is his will of command, "Thou shalt not kill," 
but it was his will of decree, his "determinate 
counsel," that they should put his Son to death. 
It is his will of command, that men should not 
commit adultery, and that they should not dis- 
honor their parents ; but it was his will of decree, 
that Absalom should do both, for he says to David, 
II Samuel 12. 11. "Behold, I will raise up evil 
against thee out of thine own house, and I will 
take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them 
unto thy neighbor, and he shall lie with thy 
wives, in the sight of this sun." This was ful- 
filled in the wicked conduct of Absalom, as re- 



WILL OF GOD, 



103 



•corded in the following- chapters. It was God's 
will of command, that Pharaoh should let his 
people go; but it was his will of decree, that 
Pharaoh should refuse to let them go, for he says 
to Moses, Exodus 4. 21. "I will harden his heart, 
that he shall not let the people go." It is his 
will of command, that men should not lie ; but it 
was his will of decree, that the prophets of Ahab 
should lie to him, for the prophet of the Lord 
says, I Kings 22. 23. " The Lord hath put a ly- 
ing spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets." 
And the scriptures use the word will in both of 
these senses. Mark 3. 35. "For whosoever shall 
do the will of God, the same is my brother, and 
my sister, and mother." There it is will of com- 
mand. I Peter 3. 17. "It is better, if the will of 
God be so, that ye suffer for well doing, than for 
evil doing." Here it is will of decree; for God 
has not commanded that men should suffer for 
well doing, though it is sometimes his decree that 
they should. Examples of this kind may be mul- 
tiplied, but these are sufficient to show, that this 
distinction is clearly warranted by scripture, and 
indeed absolutely necessary, to reconcile the scrip- 
ture with itself. When it is said, therefore, that 
sin is contrary to God's will, and yet takes place 
agreeably to his will, there is no contradiction, if 
it is understood according to the sentiments here 
advanced. Sin is always contrary to God's will 
of command, it is always undesirable in itself, it 
9 



104 



OBJECTIONS. 



is always odious in its own nature, and in that 
sense, to wit, in itself considered, he never wills 
it; while> at the same time, all the sin which does 
take place, is, on the whole, for the best, and in 
that sense, always takes place according to the 
dictates of infinite wisdom and goodness. 

The objection further supposes, that our doc- 
trine makes God will the death of the sinner, in 
such a sense as to contradict his own declaration, 
and delight in his misery, like a cruel tyrant. 
The distinction, however, laid down in our prem- 
ises, removes this part of the objection also. For 
although the infinite goodness of God makes him 
desire the good of every creature he has made, 
for its own sake, yet it makes him desire the good 
of the whole, taken collectively, more than of 
any part. And if he sees that the greatest good 
of the whole, requires that the good of a part 
should be given up, and that they should suffer 
eternal misery, his infinite goodness makes him 
desire that it should be done. When he punishes 
the devils according to their deserts, he does not 
do it because he has any delight in their pain. In 
itself considered, he desires their happiness very 
strongly. But considering the honor of his gov- 
ernment, considering how much the great inter- 
ests of the universe would suffer, if they should 
go unpunished — upon the whole, all things con- 
sidered, his goodness prompts him to punish them 
according to their deserts, and sentence them to 



WILL OF GOD. 105 

the blackness of darkness forever. So, when he 
punishes wicked men, whether in this world or 
the next, he does not do it because he delights in 
their pain. He desires their happiness, in itself 
considered, very strongly. But he desires the 
good of the universe much more; and when that 
good requires, he inflicts upon the wicked the 
punishment they deserve. In itself considered 
he willed not the punishment of Ephraim: and 
he expresses his feelings in the strongest manner. 
Hosea 11. 8. "How shall I give thee up, Eph- 
raim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? How 
shall I make thee as Admah 1 How shall I set 
thee as Zeboim? My heart is turned within me, 
my repentings are kindled together." But, at 
-the same time, he did will his punishment, on the 
whole, all things considered, and gave him up to 
suffer accordingly. He wills not the death of 
sinners, even the most obstinate and incorrigible, 
in itself considered ; it is very undesirable in it- 
self; but yet he does will their death, all things 
considered, and pronounces upon them the sen- 
tence, "depart ye cursed." He is not "willing 
that any should perish,' 5 in itself considered, "but 
that all should come to repentance," II Peter 3. 
9: it is, in itself, very desirable, that all should 
repent and be saved ; and yet, it is said of some, 
II Thess. 2. 11, 12. "God shall send them strong 
delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they 
all might be damned." In these, and similar pas- 



106 



OBJECTIONS". 



sages, God does not contradict himself; but lie 
does really, in itself considered, desire the salva- 
tion of all men ; while, on the whole, all things 
considered, he wills that some should perish. And 
when he "hardens" and "blinds" some, and "sends 
them strong delusion, that they might be damned," 
and causes them to do tho&e things which will Sk 
them for destruction, he does it for wise and bene- 
volent reasons, and not because he has any de- 
light in seeing their torments or hearing their 
groans. 

Objection 8. It is said that, whoever does the 
will of God, does right, and shall be accepted^ 
But that, if God has decreed whatsoever comes 
to pass, then, whatsoever men do, they do the will 
of God. Therefore, ail men do the will of God r 
and will be accepted with him. Besides, it is 
said, God has good and wise purposes to be ac- 
complished by all the sins which take place, they 
are all conducive to the promotion of the greatest 
good of the universe, they are not a real injury,, 
but a real benefit to God's kingdom ; and there- 
fore, they do not deserve a punishment, but a re- 
ward; and the robber, the murderer, and the 
adulterer,, will receive a reward for what they 
have done, as well- as the most diligent and faith- 
ful christian. 

Answer. This objection is nearly connected 
with the preceding one; and keeping in mind 
what has been said in answer ta that ? , this can b^ 



DOING HIS WILL. 



answered in few words. The first part of the 
objection contains the following sophism — Who- 
ever does the will of God, will be accepted. But 
all men do the will of God, if they act as he has 
decreed. Therefore, all men will be accepted, 
This is like the following sophism of the schools. 
A church is a building of stone. But a religious 
assembly is a church. Therefore, a religious 
assembly is a building of stone. Or the follow* 
ing — ^That which is sold in the shambles is eaten 
for dinner. But raw meat is sold in the shambles, 
Therefore, raw meat is eaten for dinner. The 
sophistry of all these arguments, consists in the 
words being used, in the different propositions, in 
different senses. To make the argument good, 
and the conclusion correct, the words must be 
used, each time, precisely in the same sense. It 
is true, that whoever acts agreeably to God's will 
of command, does right, and will be accepted. 
But it does not follow that all men will be accept- 
ed, unless it can be shown that all men act agree- 
ably to God's will, taken in the same sense. If 
they do act agreeably to God's will of decree, 
that is a very different thing, and God has no 
where promised tG accept of such, or expressed 
the least approbation of them on that account. 

But it is said, they promote the good of the 
universe, as really as the saints do ; and therefore, 
that they deserve a reward, and will receive it, if 
God is just, Answer. God is just, and will treat 
9* 



106 



OBJECTIONS- 



them according to their deserts. But their desert 
of reward and punishment does not depend upon 
what they effect, but upon what they intend. This- 
is the dictate of common sense. We never con- 
clude that a man is praise or blame worthy, tilt 
we inquire into his design. We never think a 
man is entitled to a reward, for having undesign- 
edly produced an effect^ when he did his utmost 
to effect the contrary. One man stabs another 
with intent to kill him. Here is murder in his 
heart. By mistake, however, he does not effect 
his purpose, but only opens an abscess, and cures- 
his intended victim ©f a disease which would 
otherwise have proved mortal. He saves the life 
he intends to destroy. He effects good, while he 
intends evil. But is he, therefore, praise worthy y 
and entitled to a reward? No one will suppose 
it. The w r icked intend evil. Their design is an 
improper design. Their spirit is a bad spirit, 
And if God does make their wickedness the 
means of promoting the greatest good of the uni- 
verse, they intend no such thing. Their hearts 
are wrong. They are enemies to God, and ene- 
mies to his kingdom. They are guilty of treason 
against the universe; and though they should be 
unsuccessful, they have done their worst; and 
they know they deserve an exemplary punish- 
ment, and they may look for it with certainty at 
the hands of a just and holy God. 

Objection 9. It is said, that if this doctrine is. 



GOSPEL OFFER. 109 

{rue, and God decrees and causes whatsoever 
comes to pass, then he decrees and causes that 
some should reject the offers of salvation. But 
that if he decrees that they shall reject the offers 
of salvation, and causes them to reject those offers, 
he cannot be sincere in making those offers to 
them. He binds the prisoner fast in chains, and 
then opens the door, and bids him come out, 
which is but mocking his misery. 

Answer. To make out the charge of insin- 
cerity against God, it must be made to appear 
that he refuses to give salvation to those who are 
willing to accept it, according to his offer. If he 
offers it on conditions which are in the power 
of every one, and gives it to all who comply with 
those conditions, and withholds it from none but 
those who refuse to comply, there is no founda- 
tion for the charge of insincerity. It would in- 
deed be an evidence of insincerity, to bind a pris- 
oner fast in chains, and then invite him to come 
out of his prison. But this supposes that the 
prisoner is willing to come out, but cannot. This 
case is not at all like that of the sinner. The 
sinner can, but will not. If the prisoner had his 
chains knocked off, and the doors set open, he 
might be sincerely invited to come out. What 
Christ has done, has opened the prison doors, and 
knocked off the chains. The sinner may come 
out, if he will. Every obstacle is removed, 
Whoever accepts the offered mercy, receives th@ 



110 



OBJECTIONS. 



benefit of it. And those who will not accept it, 
have no right to conclude that God is not sincere 
in making them the offer. 

But it is said again, that, according to the doc- 
trine supported in these discourses, God hardens 
the sinner's heart, and causes him to refuse the 
offered mercy. He cannot, therefore, desire he 
should accept it. And if he does not desire he 
should accept it, he cannot be sincere when he 
expresses such a desire, as he evidently does, in 
his offers of life, his warnings, threatenings, invi- 
tations, expostulations, and commands to choose 
life. Answer. When God, by his invitations, 
commands, &c, represents himself as desiring 
the salvation of the sinner, he must either desire 
his salvation on the whole, all things considered, 
because it is best on the whole, or only desire 
his salvation in itself considered, because it is de- 
sirable for its own sake. Is it, then, best on the 
whole, that every sinner should be saved? and 
does God, taking into view all the consequences, 
upon the whole, desire the salvation of every sin- 
ner ? and is this the desire which is expressed in 
the offers of life ? No ; this cannot be the case. 
For, if God did, on the whole, desire the salva- 
tion of every sinner, he would save every sinner. 
It is God that saves sinners, and he is as able to 
save all, as he is to save a part. If he did, on 
the whole, desire that every sinner should comply 
with the offers of salvation, he would change 



GOSPEL OFFER. 



Ill 



their hearts, and cause them to comply. It is he 
that takes away the stony heart, and gives a new 
heart : and he is able to do it in every instance, 
if he chooses. If he does not do it, then, in any 
instance, it is because he does not, on the whole, 
choose to do it, in that instance : that is, he does 
not, on the whole, choose that that sinner should 
be saved. But, should any say that God cannot 
change the sinner's heart, and make him - willing 
in the day of his power," and "cause him to walk 
in his statutes." though he does, on the whole, de- 
sire to do it: we may ask them, if God does, on 
the whole, desire the salvation of every sinner, 
why does he not do all that he can. to save them? 
If he cannot give them a new heart, and make 
them willing to comply with the terms of the 
gospel, why does he not use with them all the 
means that he can ? He could raise up more 
preachers, he could pour out his spirit, he could 
awaken the careless and secure, he could place 
beiore every sinner a lively view of the glories 
of heaven and the torments of the damned, he 
could send his gospel to all nations, he could 
furnish his preachers with all those miraculous 
gifts, which were so instrumental of spreading the 
gospel at first, he could do a thousand things, 
which he does not do, to promote the salvation of 
all men, It is evident, then, that he does not, on 
the whole, desire the salvation of all men; but 
chooses, for some wise reasons, that a part should 



112 OBJECTIONS. 

perish; and, according to his own word, " sends 
them strong delusion, that they should believe a 
lie, that they might be damned." Since, there- 
fore, God does not, on the whole, desire the salva- 
tion of all men, the offers of life, which are made 
to all, do not express a desire, on the whole, fur 
the salvation of all. But God does desire the 
salvation of all men, in itself considered. He 
views it, as in itself, exceedingly desirable. And 
the offers of life, the invitations, warnings, threat- 
enings, expostulations, and commands, express 
this desire. And they express what God sincere- 
ly feels. But they do not express any other de- 
sire, and God does not feel any other desire for 
the salvation of those he does not save. The 
salvation of a particular sinner may be exceeding- 
ly desirable in itself, while, on the whole, for 
some w ise reason, it may be best he should not be 
savf.d. God,* therefore, may, without any incon- 
sistency, sincerely desire his salvation, in itself 
considered, while, on the whole, all things con- 
sidered, he desires his destruction. He may, 
therefore, express his desire for his salvation, in 
itself considered, by offering him life, and exhort- 
ing him to choose it, and be very sincere in it ; 
while, at the same time, since his damnation is 
best on the whole, he may decree his damnation, 
and harden his heart, and "send him strong delu- 
sion, that he might be damned." 



SERMON VII. 



EPHESIANS I. 11. 

Who worketh all things after the counsel of his 
own will. 

We proceed in the discussion of objections. 

Objection 10. It is said, that if this doctrine 
is true, and all the sin that takes place is for the 
best, then sin is a good thing, and the more we 
have of it the better. And therefore, that the 
language of this doctrine is, "let us do evil that 
good may come for if we believe this doctrine 
we should not endeavor to prevent sin, but rather 
encourage it by all the means in our power. 

Answer. The same objection was made against 
this doctrine, in the days of the apostle. When 
he taught, Rom. 3. 7. that "the truth of God hath 
more abounded, through our lie, unto his glory;" 
that is, that our wickedness has been the occasion 
of manifesting the divine perfections, in a more 
glorious manner than they could otherwise have 
been manifested; he was "slanderously reported" 
and affirmed to say, "let us do evil, that good 



114 



OBJECTIONS. 



may come.' 1 But those who drew this conclu- 
sion from the doctrine, so evidently and so wick- 
edly perverted it, that he says, their "damnation is 
just." It does not follow, because the sin which 
does take place, is, on the whole, for the best, all 
things being considered, that therefore, it is good 
in its own nature. It is best, on the whole, that 
the people of God should suffer many trials in 
this life, from pain, sickness, and death, as it will 
prepare them for a higher degree of holiness and 
happiness in heaven ; but it does not follow, that 
pain, sickness, and death are good things in their 
own nature, or desirable for their own sake. Nei- 
ther does it follow, because all the sin which does 
take place is for the best, that the more there is of 
it the better. It does not follow, because it is best 
to have some pain, sickness, and death, that the 
more we have of them the better. It is best, in 
the whole compass of the year, to have some bit- 
ter cold weather ; but it does not follow, that the 
more there is of it the better. The doctrine of 
these discourses is, that whatever takes place is 
for the best ; that the present system, just as it is, 
is the best possible system. But to say, that be- 
cause the sin which does take place is for the 
best, it would be better to have more, is the same 
as to say, that because the present system is the 
best, a different system would be better, which is 
absurd. And to say, that if this doctrine is true, 
we should encourage sin, instead of opposing it, 



SIN A GOOD THING. 115 

is not a correct conclusion, for several reasons. 
In the first place, if we did not oppose it as much 
as we do, there would be more of it than there is 
now: and agreeably to our doctrine, any change, 
either way, would make the system worse. We 
must oppose it, therefore, just as much as we do, 
m order that there may not be too much. In the 
second place, we cannot know before hand, what 
particular sins will be for the best, because we 
cannot, as God does, take a view of the whole 
ground, and see things in all their connections 
and consequences : and consequently, we could 
net know what sins to oppose, and what to en- 
courage, if it could be right for us to encourage 
any. In the third place, it is the peculiar pre- 
rogative of God to make what is best on the 
whole his rule of conduct, and we have no right 
to attempt to make it ours. If we could know 
before hand, that a particular sin would be for the 
best, as we cannot, unless God informs us, still, 
God has given us no right to commit it ourselves, 
or to use our influence to have others commit it 
It was known before hand that Judas should be- 
tray Christ, for our Lord had given the informa- 
tion. But this did not give Judas a right to be- 
tray him : nor did it give the other disciples a 
ri^ht to encourage him in doino- so. It was 
known before hand that Peter should deny his 
master, for our Lord had told him. But this did 
not give him a right to do so. It was known 
10 



116 



OBJECTIONS. 



beforehand that Christ should be unjustly con- 
demned, mocked, scourged, and crucified ; for it 
was all foretold by the prophets, and by Christ 
himself. But this did not give men a right to 
perpetrate any of this wickedness. Many of the 
wicked deeds of men are foretold in the scriptures. 
And we know, that if God did not see it best on 
the whole that they should take place, he would 
prevent them. But the knowledge of all this, 
does not give any man a right to perpetrate this 
wickedness, or to encourage it. The administra- 
tion of the divine government is not committed to 
our hands. And for us to attempt to exercise it, 
would be an expression of an arrogant and wicked 
disposition. And finally, it is impossible that we 
should commit sin, with a view to do good. To 
make the good of the universe our object, is to 
exercise a right disposition ; but to commit sin, is 
to exercise a wrong disposition. And to exercise 
a wrong disposition with a right disposition, is a 
contradiction. If that external action, which 
would be the usual expression of a wicked dispo- 
sition, should be performed out of obedience to 
God, and with a view to his glory and the good 
of the universe, it would not be a sinful action. If 
the good of the universe, therefore, requires that 
a particular sin should be committed, the act must 
not only be forbidden, but it must be performed 
with a wicked disposition. If it was best on the 
whole that the Lord Jesus should be murdered, it 



WILLINGNESS TO SIN. 



117 



was impossible that this should be done with a 
view to the glory of God. For if his life was 
taken with any other disposition than a malicious 
one, it would not have been murder. And every 
one knows that a malicious disposition, and a dis- 
position that seeks the glory of God, are directly 
opposite to each other. It is impossible, there- 
fore, for a person really and sincerely to "do evil, 
that good may come," however some may make 
this their pretence. But it is our duty to obey 
God, to do what is right in itself, that is, love God 
with all our heart, and our neighbor as ourselves, 
and to express this holy temper in all those ways 
that he has pointed out in his holy word. It is 
our duty to avoid and oppose whatever God has 
forbidden, whatever is wrong in itself, and leave 
it to God to govern the universe as he sees best 
on the whole, and to make what is best on the 
whole, the rule of his conduct. 

Objection II. It is said, that if this doctrine is 
true, and God has decreed whatsoever comes to 
pass, then God has decreed that the saints should 
continue to fall into some sins, from time to time. 
He has not seen fit that they should be completely 
sanctified till death. But it is the duty of all to 
submit to God's will, to acquiesce in whatever he 
ordains, to choose whatever God chooses. It is 
the duty of the saints, therefore, to be willing not 
to be entirely freed from sin, till death ; it is their 
duty to be willing to fall intp some sins, from time 



118 



OBJECTIONS. 



to time, since they know it is God's will that the}* 
should. But it is thought, that being- willing to 
sin, is actually sinning already. And conse- 
quently, that it can never be right to be willing to 
sin. And therefore, that it cannot be God's will 
that we should sin ; and that it cannot be true that 
God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass. 

Answer. The great difficulty in this objection 
seems to be this, that to be willing to sin, is ac- 
tually sinning already. If this difficulty can be 
removed, and it can be shown that it is possible to 
be willing to sin, in a sense which is not actually 
committing sin, the objection will be answered. 
If it can be shown that we can have any kind of 
willingness to do this, which is not a sinful wil- 
lingness; if it can be shown that we can will sin 
in ourselves, in any sense which does not imply 
a love of sin, then it will appear that we can will 
sin in a good sense, in a sense perfectly consistent 
with our duty, and an entire love to God. Let us 
see, then, whether this can be done. 

It will be necessary, here, to bear in mind some 
things w 7 hich have been said in answer to former 
objections. It was seen, in the answer to a former 
objection, that we may will a thing, and not will 
it, at the same time, in different senses. It w 7 as 
seen, that a thing may be undesirable in itself, 
and so, never could be chosen for its own sake r 
while, at the same time, it may be desirable for 
the sake of some other thing connected with it f 



WILLINGNESS TO SIN. 



119 



and so, might be chosen on the whole. The hu- 
mane judge wills not the death of the criminal for 
its own sake. In itself considered, he desires his 
life. But, at the same time, he does will his 
death, on the whole, for the public good, and pro- 
nounces the sentence upon him. In the same 
manner, God never can will sin for its own sake. 
It is, in itself, that abominable thing which he 
hates. But, at the same time, when he sees that 
some great good can be accomplished by it, of 
sufficient importance to overbalance the evil, 
which good could not otherwise be accomplished; 
when he sees that a particular sin will be, on the 
whole, for the best, he wills it, he chooses it 
should take place, and brings it to pass. No sin 
takes place, but what God is, in this sense, willing 
should take place. This willingness in God, is 
not a sinful willingness, but the contrary. It 
does not imply in it any love of sin, but is per- 
fectly consistent with the greatest abhorrence of 
sin, considered as it is in iis own nature. In like 
manner, when God has made it known to the an- 
gels in heaven, that a particular sin will be for 
the best, they can be willing it should take place, 
in the same sense that God is : and this willing- 
ness does not imply in them any love of sin, but 
is perfectly consistent with their viewing it in its 
own nature with the greatest abhorrence. In 
like manner, when God has made known to holy 
men upon earth, that some sins will be for the 

1 n# 



120 



OBJEC1IONS. 



best, they can be willing that they should take 
place, in the same sense that God is. And it is 
not necessary to suppose that this willingness in 
them is sinful, any more than that the same kind 
of willingness in God is sinful. God does not 
will sin, in itself considered; neither do they. 
God does not look upon any sin, but with abhor- 
rence; neither do the}'. But God chooses that 
what is best on the whole should take place; and 
so do they. Since God sees that these sins will 
be for the best, he is on the whole, willing that 
they should take place; and since he has made 
this known to them, they are willing that they 
should take place, with the same kind of willing- 
ness that God is, and for the same reason. When 
God revealed to the ancient prophets, that it was 
a part of the plan of redemption that Christ 
should be betrayed and murdered; when they 
saw that this was the plan which God chose, and 
had reason, therefore, to conclude that it was the 
wisest and best plan possible, it was easy for them 
to acquiesce in it as such, and to choose that it 
should be accomplished. And this acquiescence 
on their part, would not imply in them any ap- 
probation of treachery or murder. When they 
saw that God chose on the whole that this treach- 
ery and murder should take place, it was easy for 
them to choose it too, for the sake of the good 
which God would accomplish by means of it. 
And their making such a choice, does not imply 



WILLINGNESS TO SIX. 



121 



in them any love of these sins, any more than it 
does in God, when he makes the same choice. 
And it was not only possible for them to make 
this choice, with these views and reasons, but it 
was their duty to do so. It was their duty to hate 
and abhor all treachery and murder : but when 
they saw, by divine inspiration, that it was in this 
case for the best that they should be committed, it 
was their duty to choose that they should be com- 
mitted, and not to choose that the whole plan of 
redemption should be given up. in order to avoid 
them. In like manner, therefore, if God sees that 
it will be tor the best, that the saints should not be 
entirely freed from sin in this life, he chooses that 
they should not. And he chooses it for that rea- 
son alone, and not because he has any delight in 
sin. for he has not. And if he has made known 
in his word that it is for the best that the saints 
should not be entirely freed from sin in this life, 
and that for this reason he chooses they should 
not. they may make the same choice, for the 
same reason. And since it does not imply any 
love of sin in God, when he makes this choice 
for this reason, neither does it imply any love of 
sin in the saints, when they make the same choice 
for the same reason. But. to prevent mistakes, 
let it be carefully noted, that a willingness that 
sin should take place in ourselves or others, to be 
right, must be entirely free from a love of sin. it 
must be entirely free from any motives of self- 



122 



OBJECTIONS. 



gratification, it must be entirely from a devoted- 
ness to the glory of God; in short, it must be just 
such a willingness that sin should take place as 
God himself feels. This kind of willingness 
that sin should take place, is very different from 
that willingness which the sinner feels. They 
.are directly opposite and contrary to each other. 
God is willing that sin should take place in all 
those instances in which it does take place, not 
for its own sake, for he abhors it, but because he 
sees it will be for the greatest good of the uni- 
verse, because he sees it will afford an occasion 
of displaying, to better advantage, his own glo- 
rious perfections. But the sinner is willing that 
sin should take place, in himself and others, for 
its own sake, because he loves it, because he hates 
holiness, and has no regard for the greatest good 
of the universe, nor the glory of the divine char- 
acter. When the saints are willing that sin 
should take place, therefore, whether in them* 
selves or others, that willingness must be just 
such a willingness as God feels, it must be an act 
of submission to God's will ; for if not, it will not 
be a duty, but a sin. 

Should it be objected, here, that if it is possible 
for us to have a present willingness that sin should 
take place in us at some future time, which is not 
a sinful willingness, but such a willingness as 
God feels, and is consistent with a perfect hatred 
and abhorrence of sin, why is it not possible for 



WILLINGNESS TO SIN. 123 

lis actually to commit sin, from a regard to the 
glory of God, and so, "do evil, that good may 
come"? This question has been already answer- 
ed, in the reply to a former objection. It is im- 
possible that we should commit sin, with a view 
to do good. To have a supreme regard to the 
glory of God, is to exercise a right disposition. 
But to commit sin, is to exercise a wrong disposi- 
tion. And to exercise a wrong disposition with a 
right disposition, is a contradiction. The objec- 
tion arises entirely from confounding two distinct 
acts of the mind. The act of submission is one 
act, and the act of sin is another act. And they 
cannot both take place at the same time., One 
must succeed the other. The first act may have 
some reference to the second, but it is totally dis- 
tinct from it, and may be of a nature directly op- 
posite. We often hear sinners, under awakenings, 
say, they desire to repent. This desire is one 
act, and the act of repentance is another act. 
The first has reference to the second, but they 
are entirely distinct, and they may be of a nature 
directly opposite. The act of repentance must 
have the glory of God for its object. But the 
desire to repent, may have nothing but our per- 
sonal safety for its object. And if it has nothing 
but self for its object, it is a sinful act. It is a 
sinful willingness to be the subject of a holy exer- 
cise. So, in this case, the act of submission, and 
the act of sin, are distinct acts. The act of sin 



124 



OBJECTIONS. 



cannot have the glory of God for its object, but 
the act of submission must have the glory of God 
for its object. A present willingness to have sin 
take place in us at some future time, may be just 
such a willingness as God feels, it may be an act 
of submission to God. It may be a holy willing- 
ness to be the subject of a sinful exercise, just as 
a sinful desire of repentance, may be a sinful wil- 
lingness to be the subject of a holy exercise. But 
the actual exercise of sin, is a very different thing 
from the act of submission, and can never be per- 
formed with a view to the glory of God. 

Objection 12. It is said, that if this doctrine 
is true, and God has decreed whatsoever comes to 
pass, then he has decreed that some men should 
continue finally impenitent, and perish forever. 
But all are bound to submit to God's will, to ac- 
quiesce in whatever he ordains. All ought, there- 
fore, to choose that those should continue sinners, 
whom God chooses should continue so, and all 
ought to choose that those should be damned, 
whom God chooses should be damned. But 
since all are alike bound to acquiesce in God's 
will, those very persons, who are the subjects of 
this decree of reprobation, are as much bound to 
acquiesce in it, as any others. And since we do 
not certainly know but that we are included in 
that decree of reprobation, we ought to be willing 
to acquiesce in it, if it should prove to be so ; that 
is, we ought to be willing to be finally impenitent, 



WILLINGNESS TO PERISH. 125 

and to be damned, if it should prove to be God's 
determination respecting us. But, it is said, be- 
ing willing to be damned, and being willing to be 
finally impenitent, is nothing else than being wil- 
ling to sin, nothing else than being willing to 
curse and blaspheme God for ever, nothing else 
than "being willing to be an infernal;" and it is 
thought, that being willing to sin, is actually 
committing sin, and that "being willing to be an 
infernal," is little short of being one already. It 
cannot, therefore, it is thought, be the duty of any 
one to be willing to be damned, or to be willing to 
sin, under any circumstances. But since it is 
the duty of every one to submit unconditionally 
to the will of God, it cannot be the will of God 
that any one should sin, or that any one should 
be damned ; and therefore, it cannot be true that 
God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass. 

Annver. It is undoubtedly true, that all are 
bound to submit to God's will, and to acquiesce 
in whatever he ordains. And this submission 
must be unconditional ; for a conditional submis- 
sion is no submission at all. And it is also true, 
that if God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass, 
he has decreed that some should be finally impeni- 
tent and be damned. All are bound, therefore, to 
be willing that some should continue finally im- 
penitent and be damned. And while it is un- 
known who are included in that decree of repro- 
bation, we are no more at liberty to withhold our 



126 



OBJECTIONS. 



assent to it, than we shall be after it is known. 
And we are not at liberty to stipulate, when we 
give our assent, that we shall not be the persons. 
We must leave that with God. He will order it 
wisely. To say we are at liberty to make this 
stipulation, is the same as to say, we may with- 
hold our assent, if this stipulation is not admitted, 
which is the same as to say, that we are not bound 
to acquiese at all, but may act our pleasure. And 
when it shall be known who are included in the 
decree of reprobation, we shall not then be any 
more at liberty to withhold our assent. And if it 
should be found that we are the perso?is, that will 
give us no right to rebel against it. We shall 
still be bound to acquiesce, as much as we should 
be, if others were in our place, and we were left 
out. We should love our neighbor as ourselves. 
If our being included in that decree, would ren- 
der it proper for us to oppose it, our neighbor's 
being included, would render it equally proper 
for us to oppose it. But we should have no right 
to oppose it, in either case. We are bound to 
acquiesce entirely in what God ordains. If God, 
in infinite wisdom, sees that it will be for the best, 
that Judas should be a reprobate, and perish for 
ever, and has so decreed, and made known to us 
that this is the case, we are bound to acquiesce. 
If God chooses that Judas should suffer the pains 
of hell eternally, we ought to choose it too. And 
it is not seen why Judas is not bound to acquiesce 



WILLINGNESS TO PERISH. 127 

in it, as much as any others. It is not seen why 
Judas is not as much bound to submit to God's 
will respecting him as other beings are. And if 
God chooses that Judas should suffer the pains of 
hell eternally, because he sees that it will be for 
the best, and all others are bound to choose it too, 
because God does, why is not Judas bound to 
make the same choice, for the same reason? And 
if God chooses that Judas should go on in sin to 
eternity, because he sees that it will be for the 
best, and all other creatures are bound to choose 
it too, because God does, why is not Judas bound 
to make the same choice, for the same reason % 
What makes it the duty of Judas to rebel against 
the will of God, when all other creatures are 
bound to acquiesce in it? But the chief difficulty 
seems to lie in this : it is said that, being willing 
to sin, is actually committing sin. It is thought, 
however, that what has been said in answer to 
the last objection, has been sufficient to remove 
this difficulty. It has been seen that there are 
two kinds of icillingness that sin should take 
place, one, that which God feels, and another, 
that which the sinner feels. And these two kinds 
of willingness are very different from each other, 
and of a nature directly opposite. One is consis- 
tent with the greatest abhorrence of sin, and the 
other implies a love of sin. The latter is a sin- 
ful willingness, but the former is not. To feel 
such a willingness that sin should take place, as 
11 



128 OBJECTIONS, 

God feels, is the duty of all. But to feel such a 
willingness that sin should take place, as the sin- 
ner feels, is actually committing sin. It is our 
duty to feel as God feels, respecting it ; and con- 
sequently, it is not our duty to feel in a different 
manner. In the great day, when the wicked are 
sentenced to hell, all holy beings will acquiesce 
in it, and choose that they should be sent there. 
But those who go there will continue to sin, they 
will curse and blaspheme God to eternity. To 
choose that the wicked should be sent to hell, 
therefore, is not only choosing that they should 
suffer eternal pain, but it is also choosing that 
they should continue to sin, it is choosing that 
they should curse and blaspheme God to eternity. 
And when holy beings, in the great day, acquiesce 
in all this, and choose all this, it will not imply in 
them any love of sin, or any delight in the curses 
and blasphemies of the damned. And it will not 
only be possible for all holy beings to acquiesce 
in this sentence, but it will be their duty to ac- 
quiesce in it, and to choose that it should take 
place. And it will not be the duty of holy beings 
only, but it will also be the duty of wicked be- 
ings ; it will be the duty of the whole universe of 
creatures, to acquiesce in this sentence, and to 
choose that it should take place. Their being 
wicked does not alter the nature of their duty, nor 
free them from their obligations to discharge it. 
And their being the subjects of the sentence will 



Willingness to perish. 129 

no more give them a right to rebel against it, than 
it will give other beings a right to rebel against 
it. It is true that they never will exercise this 
unconditional submission to God's will; but what 
they will do, and what they ought to do, are very 
different things. It is true that the damned will 
always feel that willingness to sin, which implies 
a love of sin, that willingness which is a sinful 
willingness. It is true that they always will love 
sin, and hate holiness, that they always will be 
opposed to the will of God, and his holy govern- 
ment. But it is not, on that account, any the less 
certain, that they ought to feel in a very different 
manner. In the great day, when God has pro- 
nounced the final sentence upon the wicked, it 
will be known that it is his will that they should 
suffer the pains of hell to eternity. It will be 
their duty, therefore, to submit to this sentence, 
and acquiesce in it, because it is for the glory of 
God that they should so suffer. It is true, indeed, 
that they will not exercise this submission, but 
will always rage and rebel against God. But 
that does not alter their duty. Again, when the 
final sentence shall be pronounced upon the wick- 
ed, it will be known that it is God's will that they 
should continue sinners to eternity. And all 
holy beings will acquiesce in this, and choose it 
too, for the same reason that God does, namely, 
because it will be most for his glory, and the 
gsod of the universe, But the willingness which 



130 



OBJECTIONS. 



God, and all holy beings, will feel, that thi;$ 
should take place, will not be a sinful willing- 
ness, it will not be a willingness which implies 
in it any love of sin, but the contrary. And those 
who are the subjects of this sentence, ought to ac- 
quiesce in it, as much as other beings, and they 
ought to feel the same kind of willingness that it 
should take place, which God and all holy beings 
will feel. It is true, indeed, that they will not. 
They will feel a willingness to be sinners, but it 
will be a willingness of a very different nature 
from that which they ought to feel, and from that 
which God will feel that they should be so ; it 
will be a willingness which implies a love of sin; 
it will be a sinful willingness. The pains they 
will suffer, will have no tendency to wean them 
from their love of sin, or to make them love God 
and holiness ; but they will continue to love sin 
with all their hearts, and to hate God and holiness 
for ever. 

And since we do not yet know, with certainty, 
what God has determined respecting us, we ought 
to be willing to be entirely in his hands, as clay 
in the hands of the potter, that he may mould us 
into such vessels as he pleases, and dispose of us 
at last, just as he pleases. We ought to be will- 
ing that he should make us any thing that he shall 
see most for his glory : and since we do not know 
with certainty but that the glory of God will re- 
quire our eternal destruction, we ought to be will- 



WILLINGNESS TO PERISH. 131 

ing to submit, and to acquiesce in Go<Fs will, if it 
should prove to be so. But when he requires this 
of us, he does not require us to love pain, or to 
choose it for its own sake ; nor does he require us 
to be willing that sin should take place, in our- 
selves or others, with any kind of willingness 
which implies a love of sin, but the contrary. 
And while we commit ourselves to him, to be 
disposed of, as he shall deem proper, it is our con* 
stant duty to hate every sin, to love God with all 
our hearts, and our neighbor as ourselves, and to 
express this love in all those ways which he has 
pointed out in his holy word. 



11* 



SERMON VIII. 



EPHESIANS J. 11. 

Who worketh all things after the counsel of his 
own will. 

We proceed in the discussion of objections. 

Objection 13. It is said, that God requires us 
to repent of sin. But to repent of sin, implies 
that we are sorry that we have sinned, that we re- 
gret that we have sinned, that we wish we had 
not sinned. But God requires us to feel just as 
he feels. God, therefore, repents that we have 
sinned, he is sorry that we have sinned, he wishes 
we had not sinned. When the world became so 
wicked in the days of Noah, we read, Gen. 6. 6. 
"It repented the Lord that he had made man on 
the earth, and it grieved him at his heart." But 
this is totally inconsistent with his decreeing and 
causing sin to take place. It cannot be true, 
therefore, that he either decrees or causes it. 

Answer. It is true that God requires us to feel 
towards sin and holiness, just as he feels. But 
the objection takes something for granted,, which 
is not true, namely, that God does, on the whole, 



DUTY TO REPENT. 



133 



regret that sin has taken place, or that he requires 
us to do so. That repentance which we are re- 
quired to exercise, consists in a disapprobation of 
sin, considered as it is in its own nature, together 
with a loathing and abhorring of ourselves as 
sinners. The true penitent hates sin, in itself 
considered, and hates himself, considered as a sin- 
ner: he views his own character with shame and 
detestation, and considering sin as it is in itself, he 
looks back upon his sin with the deepest sorrow. 
But considering the sins which have taken place, 
in connection with the great good, which God 
brings out of them, which could not otherwise be 
accomplished; considering them as upon the 
whole, for the best ; and necessary for the greatest 
good of the universe, the good man does not. up- 
on the whole, wish they had not taken place. Xo 
good man can, on the whole, wish that Christ 
had not been crucified, and so, that an atonement 
had not been made, for the sins of the world. It 
was in this view of the subject, that the apostle 
could say. Rom. 6. 17. "Odd be thanked that ye 
were the servants of sin.' : It was, on the whole, 
for the best, that they had been, for a time, the 
servants of sin. And when the good man looks 
back upon his own sins, though in themselves he 
abhors them, and abhors himself on account of 
them : yet, considered as a part of God's infinitely 
wise and benevolent plan, he does not wish, on 
the whole, that they had not taken place. 



134 



OBJECTIONS. 



It is said, however, that God requires us to feel 
towards sin as he feels ; and that, when he saw 
the corruption of the old world, he repented that 
he had made man upon the earth, and given him 
an opportunity to conduct in such a manner, 
which expresses a strong wish that he had not 
conducted in such a manner. Answer. Let us 
suppose, for a moment, that God does, on the 
whole, wish that man had not sinned, that he did, 
on the whole, regret that he had made man, when 
he saw his wicked conduct; and where will it 
lead us ? If God did, on the whole, wish he had 
not made man, he had changed his mind, and was 
sorry for what he had done. If he changed his 
mind, it must be for some reason, or for no rea- 
son. It will not be said that God changed his 
mind without any reason. If he really changed 
his mind, it was because man had conducted in a 
manner which he did not expect. When he made 
him, he expected he would do better than he now 
finds he has, and so he wishes he had not made 
him. But this supposition destroys the fore- 
knowledge of God. And this supposition makes 
God progressive in his knowledge, like ourselves. 
And if this is true, then, if we go back eternally, 
we shall find God without any knowledge, as 
well as without any determinations. This is 
blank atheism. But if God knew all things from 
eternity, then he knew how man would conduct, 
before he made him, as well as he does now, 



DUTY TO REPENT. 



135 



And consequently, if, in the view of all his eon- 
duct, he did then, on the whole, choose to make 
him, he cannot now, in the same view of his con- 
duct, wish he had not made him. To say that 
he does, is to say, that he has changed his mind 
without any reason. When God, therefore, is 
said to repent that he had made man, and to be 
grieved at his heart, it cannot mean, that he does, 
on the whole, wish he had not made him. But 
it must mean, that, in itself considered, the con- 
duct of man was so undesirable and odious, that 
when the good consequences were left ou: of 
view, the existence of man was an undesirable 
event, and a matter of grief. ' And so God feels 
towards every sin that is past. In themselves 
considered, he views them as exceedingly unde- 
sirable and odious : but when he considers them 
iu connection with the good he will bring out of 
them, which could not otherwise be attained, all 
things considered, he does not wish they had not 
taken place, or he would have prevented their 
taking place : nor does he require his creatures to 
wish, on the whole, that they had not taken place. 
Past sins, as well as present and future sins, may 
be considered as they are in themselves, and they 
may be considered as they are on the whole. In 
themselves considered, they are exceedingly unde- 
sirable : but. on the whole, all that -do take place, 
under the wise government of God, are for the 
best, and in that point of view, God can, and does, 



136 



OBJECTIONS. 



decree and cause ^hem to take place ; and good 
men may, on the whole, rejoice that they do take 
place, and with the apostle thank God that they 
have taken place, in perfect consistency with the 
deepest repentance, and the most genuine godly 
sorrow. 

Objection 14. It is said, that the scriptures ex- 
pressly contradict the doctrine supported in these 
discourses; for we read, James 1. 13. "Let no 
man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of 
God ; for God cannot be tempted with evil, nei- 
ther tempteth he any man." And this passage 
is thought abundantly sufficient to answer all 
those passages which are brought to prove that 
God does decree or cause the wicked actions of 
men. 

Answer. It is undoubtedly true, that the scrip- 
ture is consistent with itself, and that it does not 
teach one thing in one place, and the contrary in 
another. And if this passage does, in fact, deny 
the agency of God in producing the wicked ac- 
tions of men, then it cannot be true that it is 
taught in any of those passages which have been 
brought to prove it. But are we sure that this 
passage does deny this ? The word tempt is used, 
in scripture, in different senses. If this is not the 
case, the scripture contradicts itself. For it says, 
that God does tempt men, as in Gen. 22. L "It 
eame to pass, after these things, that God did 
tempt Abraham; 5 ' and in this place, it says he 



TEMPTING TO SIN. 



137 



does not tempt any man. In order, therefore, to 
substantiate this objection, it must be proved, that 
to tempt, in this passage, is used to signify just 
such an agency in causing the actions of men, a3 
in these discourses, is ascribed to God. Those 
who make the objection, therefore, are bound to 
prove this, before they ask us to conclude that our 
do trine is not true. To tempt, is sometimes used 
to signify a sinful act, a wicked enticing to sin, by 
representing it in false colors, as good and desira- 
ble. In this sense it is used, when applied to Sa- 
tan and wicked men. They always tempt others 
in this sense. In this sense, God does not tempt 
any man. And our doctrine does not make him 
do so. He is holy in all his works. Whatever 
influence he uses upon the minds of men, to make 
them accomplish his purposes, he always does 
right: and he always cbsigns and accomplishes 
good, by what he does. If the word may be 
used in this sense, in the passage before us, then 
thi* passage may not contradict "he doctrine ad- 
vanced in these discourses. And as this sense 
will reconcile it with those numerous passages 
which expressly assert that God worketh all 
things : and as the sense put upon it by those who 
bring the objection, would make it contradict 
them, we ought to understand it in this sense, and 
not in one that will make the scripture a mass of 
contradictions. 

This objection, however, will admit of a differ- 



138 



OBJECTIONS. 



ent answer. This passage speaks only of tempt- 
ing men to sin ; but the object of inquiry, in these 
discourses, is not who temps men to sin, but who 
causes them to sin. Tempting men to sin, is not 
causing them to sin, for they may be tempted, and 
yet not sin. And though it should be proved that 
God tempted them to sin, it would not follow that 
he caused them to sin.- Neither will it follow, 
because he causes them to sin, that therefore, he 
also tempts them. Satan is the tempter. He 
brings the temptation before the mind, and the 
mind chooses or refuses. But what causes it to 
choose or refuse? What causes it to comply 
with the temptation, or reject it, as the case may 
be ? To this question, the answer is, God causes 
men to will and do whatever they will and do. 
But the act of presenting the temptation, and the 
act of causing a compliance with it, are entirely 
distinct frpm each other, and are performed by 
different agents. And though it should be said 
that God causes Satan to tempt men, this would 
not be saying that it is God that tempts them, any 
more than it would be saying it is God that walks, 
when we say he causes men to walk. This ob- 
jection, therefore, does not apply to the doctrine 
supported in these discourses, even though the 
passage should mean, that God does not tempt 
men, in any sense of the word. 

Objection 15. It is said, that this doctrine is 
new divinity; that it is the offspring of the mod- 



NEW DIVINITY. 



139 



ern philosophy. And the exhortation of the apos- 
tle is, "Beware, lest any man spoil you, through 
philosophy and vain deceit." ''Hold fast the 
form of sound words." "Earnestly contend for 
the faith which was once delivered to the saints." 
We have in our Westminster Confession of Faith, 
and Larger and Shorter Catechisms, an excellent 
system of divinity. Let us hold them fast, and 
not admit any new-fangled doctrines. 

Answer. Here, with all due deference to anti- 
quity, we would ask, does it follow that any 
scheme is right, because it is old? Are we 
bound, in all cases, to receive the traditions of the 
fathers, without examination ? Is it reasonable to 
• condemn a thing unheard and unexamined, be- 
cause it is new ? Is it not our duty to search the 
scriptures, and see whether these things are so ? 
11 To the laic, and to the testimony; if we speak 
not according to this word, it is because there is 
no light in us." The Confession of Faith and 
Catechisms, compiled by the Assembly of Divines 
at Westminster, and adopted by our church, are, 
indeed, an excellent system of doctrines. They 
are, perhaps, the best that ever have been com- 
piled ; but they may not be infallible, in every re- 
spect. We ought, therefore, to be well acquainted 
with them, and know what doctrines they do con- 
tain, and on what scripture evidence those doc- 
trines are founded. But the doctrine which is 
supported in these discourses, is not new divinity. 
12 



140 OBJECTIONS. 

It is not the offspring of the modern infidel phil- 
osophy, as some would make us believe. No, it 
is old divinity. It is the divinity of the great Re- 
formers from Popery ; it is the divinity of our 
Confession of Faith and Catechism, as well as 
the divinity of the Bible. It is those that deny 
this doctrine, that have departed from the tradi- 
tions of the fathers, and from that form of sound 
words which they profess to hold. These asser- 
tions are not made without evidence. And enough 
of that evidence shall be produced, to convince 
you. 

ik It was the doctrine of that first great Re- 
former, Martin Luther, as the following extracts 
from his writings will show.* In a book which 
he wrote against the Arminian notion of free 
will, entitled "Be Servo Arbilrio" that is, "Free 
will a Slave" he says, "Both good and evil men, 
by their actions, fulfil the decree and appointment 
of God. "f Again, "This mightily offends our 

* By making these extracts from Luther and others, the 
author would not be understood as approving of all their 
language or sentiments. He thinks some of their lan- 
guage very objectionable. His object is to show, that they 
believed and taught the doctrine of the universal decrees 
and agency of God: and he thinks lhe extracts from them 
render that point abundantly manifest. Whether they 
had clear views of the consistency of that doctrine with 
that of the free agency and ability of the creature, is ano- 
ther question. Some of their language renders it proba- 
ble that they had not. 

t De Servo Arb. cap. 44. These extracts from Luther . 
are copied from Toplady's translation of Zanchius on 
Predestination 3 and are undoubtedly correct, 



NEW DIVINITY. 141 

rational nature, that God should, of his own mere 
unbiassed will, leave some men to themselves, har- 
den ihem, and then condemn them. But he has 
given abundant demonstration, and does continual- 
ly, that this is really the case, namely, that the 
sole cause why some are saved and others perish, 
proceeds from his willing the salvation of the 
former, and the perdition of the latter, according 
to that of Paul, *He hath mercy on whom he 
will have mercy, and whom he will he harden* 
efch.' Again, ''Whatever man does, he does 
'i€ccssarilp\ though not with any sensible compul- 
sion. We can only do what God from eternity 
willed and foreknew we should, which will of 
God must be effectual, and his foresight must be 
certain. * : Again, i4 It may seem absurd to human 
wisdom, that God should harden, blirtd and de- 
liver up some men to a reprobate sense: that he 
^hc^ii fijrst deliver them over to evil: and then 
condemn them for that evil: but the believing, 
spiritual man sees no absurdity at all in this. 5 ; t 
Here is a sentence which is worthy of particular 
attention. "God worketh all things in 
CtIex. even wickedness in the wicked: for 
this is one branch of his own omnipotence."; 
Again. "God would not be a respectable being, if 
he were not almighty, and the doer of all things 
that an do?ie;$ or if any thing could come to 

* De Servo Arb. cap, 161. t Cap. 8, 146. i Cap. 8, 165. 

§ By doer, Luther appears to mean the causer, and not 
*he actor, properly speaking, or in such a sense as to ex- 
clude the creature's agency-. 



142 



OBJECTIONS, 



pass, in which he had no hand."* These are the 
words of Luther. Surely, no one, after reading" 
these passages from his writings, can doubt, that 
Luther held the doctrines supported in these dis- 
courses. If he could say, that "God tvorketh all 
things in men, even wickedness in the wicked" and 
that he is "the doer of all thing's that are done," he 
fully believed, that God has not only decreed 
whatsoever comes to pass, but that he executes 
his decrees by his own agenc}^. And he did not 
think it an unprofitable doctrine. He was very 
warm, against Erasmus for opposing its being 
preached, and gives some very satisfactory rea- 
sons why it should be freely taught. He says, 
" Without the knowledge of this doctrine, it is not 
possible that there should be any faith in God, or 
any proper worship of him."f And Melancthon, 
the friend of Luther, says, "A right fear of God, 
and a true confidence in him, can be learned more 
assuredly from no other source, than from the 
doctrine of predestination." Peter Martyr, ano- 
ther of the Reformers, says, "He (God) supplies 
wicked men with opportunities of sinning, and 
inclines their hearts thereto, He blinds, deceives^ 
and seduces them. He, hy his- working mi their 
hearts, bends, and stirs them up t& d&eviU'^ And 
Zuinglius, another Reformer, says, " When God 
makes angels or men sin, he does not sin himself, 
because he does not break any law."§ 

*De Servo Arb. c. 160. f De Servo Arb. c. 20. 
t Com. Rem. b. xxxvi. § Serm. de Pro;Y. 



NEW DIVINITY. 



143 



2. It was the doctrine of John Calvin. In 
his Institutes, or system of divinity, he has a 
chapter upon this very subject,* in which he pro- 
fesses to show, "that God doth so use the service 
of wicked men, and so boiceth their minds to put 
his judgments in execution, that still himself re- 
maineth pure from all spot." The second section 
of which chapter shows, that "the Providence of 
God is a governess, which direct ith all the incli- 
nations of the mind of man, whether they bend 
unto good or evil." In this chapter, he says, 
"Men do nothing but by the secret commandment 
of God/' Meaning, doubtless, his secret influence. 
Again, he says, 4b But nothing can be desired to 
be more plainly spoken, than where he so often 
pronounceth that he blind cth the eyes of men, and 
striketh them with giddiness ; that he maketh 
them drunk with the spirit of drowsiness, casteth 
them into madness, and hardeneth their hearts. ;J 
Again, "Absalom, defiling his father's bed with 
incestuous adultery, committed detestable wicked- 
ness : yet God pronounced that this teas his own 
work; for the words are these: 'Thou hast done 
it secretly, but I will do it openly, and before the 
sun.' " Again, " These things many do refer to 
sufferance, (permission,) as if, in forsaking the 
reprobate, he suffered them to be blinded by Sa- 
tan. But that solution is too fond, confident, for- 
asmuch as the Holy Ghost, in plain words, ex- 

* The eighteenth chapter of the first book. 

12* 



144 



OBJECTIONS, 



presseth, that they are stricken with blindness and 
madness by the just judgment of God. It is said 
that he hardened the heart of Pharaoh ; also that 
he did make dull and strengthen it. Some do, 
with an unsavory cavillation, mock out these 
phrases of speech, because where in another 
place, it is said, Pharaoh did harden his own 
heart, there is his own will set for the cause of 
his hardening, as though these things did not 
very well agree together. Although in divers 
manners that man, while he is moved in working 
by God, doth also work himself." Here, Calvin 
explicitly maintains the consistency of the agency 
of God with the agency of the creature, and 
teaches the same doctrine which is supported in 
these discourses, that we act, and at the same time 
are caused to act by divine power. Again, he 
says, still more explicitly, "I grant that God doth 
oftentimes work in the reprobate by Satan's service,, 
as a mean ; but yet so that Satan doth his office 
by God's moving. It is also said that the same 
Satan doth blind the minds of the unfaithful, but 
how so, but only because the effectual working of 
error cometh from God himself, to make them be- 
lieve lies? 1 Can there remain any doubt that 
Calvin taught the doctrine of these discourses ? 
But let us read further. It appears that there 
were some in the days of Calvin, as well as in 
our own, who denied the divine agency in pro- 
ducing the actions of wicked men, and endeavor- 



NEW DIVINITY. 



143 



ed to explain those scriptures which assert it, to 
mean nothing more than that God permits them 
to do as they do, These men. at this clay, often 
call themselves strict Calvinists. Let us see, then, 
what Calvin says of such Calvinists. Speaking 
of them, he observes. "And their modesty were, 
perad Venture, excusable, whom the show of absur- 
dity putteth in fear, if it were not so, that they 
in ongfully. and with a lying defence, go about to 
deliver the justice of God from all unrightful 
blame. It seemeth to them unreasonable, that 
man should, by the will and commandment of 
God, be made blind, and so. by and by, be pun- 
ished for his blindness; therefore, they seek to es- 
cape by this shift, that this is done by the permis- 
but not by the will of God. But he himself 
plainly pronouncing that he doeth it. does reject 
that shift" Again, he says. "Forasmuch as 
hitherto I have recited only such things as are 
written in the scriptures plainly, not doubtfully : 
let them that fear not wrongfully to slander the 
heavenly oracles, take heed what manner of judg- 
ment they take upon them ; for if by feigned pre- 
tending of ignorance they seek a praise of mod- 
esty, what can be imagined more proudly done, 
than to set one small word against the authority 
of God ! But if they openly speak evil what 
prevail they with spitting against the heaven'? 
But this is no new example of waywardness, be- 
cause there have been in all ages wicked and uri- 



146 



OBJECTIONS. 



godly men, that with raging mouth barked against 
this point of doctrine." Again, he says, "And 
now I have showed, plainly enough, that God is 
the author (cause) of all those things, which these 
judges would have to happen only by his idle per- 
mission." He recognises the distinction which 
we make between the will of command and will 
of decree, or willing things as they are in them- 
selves, or as they are on the whole, and says, "By 
the weakness of our wit, we conceive not how 
God, in divers manner, willeth, and willeth not, 
one self thing." Again, in his commentary on 
Rom. 9. 18, he says, "This word of hardening, 
which in the scriptures is ascribed to God, does 
not signify permission merely, but agency." And 
in his commentary on Ex. 7. 3, he calls those 
cold speculatists, who turn it into a bare permis- 
sion* But the writings of Calvin are so full of 
this doctrine, that it needs but a very slight ac- 
quaintance with them, to perceive that the charge 
of not being Calvinistic, which is sometimes made 
against those who hold and teach this doctrine, 
belongs not to them, but to those who deny it, and 
who are the very persons that make the charge. 

3. It was the doctrine of the celebrated Wit- 
sius. Witsius lived after the reformed religion 
had become established. He was a professor of 

* In the original, it is frigidi speculators. Another 
epithet he gives them, still more expressive, is diluti mod- 
el at ores. 



NEW DIVINITY, 147 

divinity, in one of the universities of Holland, 
His works are in very high estimation, among 
those reputed orthodox, both in Europe and 
America. Mr. Hervey, in his Theron and As- 
pasio, says of the works of Witsius, "I know not 
any comparison more proper to represent their 
true character, than the golden pot which had 
manna; and was outwardly bright with burnished 
gold, inwardly rich with heavenly food." His 
4 " Economy of the Covenants." from which the 
following extracts are made, is recommended in 
the highest terms, by some of the most respected 
of those divines in America who are considered 
as maintaining the firmest stand against new divi- 
nity. They say, "Great erudition, solid argu- 
ment, and accurate criticism, are here happily 
employed in establishing the truth, and vindicat- 
ing the peculiar doctrines of the gospel. No 
book that has been published, since the reforma- 
tion of the church, is more worthy the attention 
and study of candidates for the ministry."* A 
book with such recommendations, will not be sus- 

* The following, among other distinguished names, are 
subscribed to this recommendation. Of the Dutch Re- 
formed Church, the Rev. John H. Livingston, D. D. S. 
T. P., President of the College at New-Brunswick, N. 
J., the Rev. William Linn. D. D.. the Rev. John N. Abed, 
D. D., and the Rev. G. A.Kuypers, D. D.: Of the Asso- 
ciate Reformed Church, the Rev. John M. Mason, D. D. ; 
Provost of Columbia College, and Professor of Divinity 
in the Theological Seminary at New-York : And of the 
Presbyterian Church, the Rev. Ashbel Green, D. D., Pres- 
ident of the College at Princeton. N. J., the Rev. John 



148 



OBJECTIONS. 



pected of new divinity. Let us hear, then, what 
Witsius says on the subject before us. 

In one place, speaking of the powers with 
which God had created man, he says, "It was 
requisite that God, by the continual influence of 
his providence, should preserve those powers, and 
excite them to all and each of their acts. For 
in no state can a creature be, or (be) conceived to 
be working any thing independently of the crea- 
tor."* In other places, he says, "I think it will 
be readily granted, that there is but one first 
cause. If the human will could produce any ac- 
tion, of which God was not the author, (cause) 
the human will would have the nature of a first 
principle." "A second cause cannot act, unless 
acted upon, and previously moved to act, by the 
preventing and predetermining influence of the 
first cause." "Since the act of sin is a kind of 
being, it would follow, that if the actions of sin, 
as actions, are not from God, there would be some 
being which had not its essence from God ; and 
thus, God would not be the universal cause of all 
beings ; which is contrary to the perfection of the 
first being." "Neither does God only excite and 
predetermine the will of men to vicious actions, 
but he so excites it, that it is not possible, but thus 

Rogers, D. D., the Rev. Samuel Miller, D. D., Professor 
of Ecclesiastical History in the Theological Seminary at 
Princeton, the Rev, John McKnight D. D., and the Rev, 
Philip Milledoler, D. D. 
* Book I, chap. 2, section 13. 



NEW DIVINITY. 149 

acted upon, it shall act." Again, speaking of the 
first sin of man, he says, "Supposing, therefore, 
that God had afforded his influence to the natural 
act of reasoning, willing, eating, as he actually 
did, it could not otherwise be, but that man should 
act at that time. All this holds true, not only 
with respect to this first sin of man, but with re- 
spect to all other sins. As these things are mat- 
ters of evident truth, I see not why we may not 
boldly maintain them, especially as they tend to 
the glory of God, and to demonstrate his super- 
eminence, and the absolute dependence of the crea- 
tures upon him, as much in their operations, as in 
their existence. 7 '* 

4. It is the doctrine of our Confession of Faith 
and Catechism. In the Confession of Faiih, ch, 
5, sec. 4, it is said, "The almighty power, un- 

* B. I, ch. ft, sec. 13, and onward. It will perhaps be 
said, that Witsius is not quoted fairly, because only a few 
detached sentences are taken from different places, and 
the whoie of what he says on this subject, is not inserted. 
It must be recollected, however, tnat the particular point 
supported in these discourses, is, thai God causes all the ac- 
tions of men, whether good or evil. As to this poiny Wit- 
sius is fairly quoted, as every one may see, by reading the 
sections referred to. He does, indeed, for the purpose of 
obviating a supposed difficulty, attempt to show that God 
can cause the actions of men, as actions, without causing 
their qualities. But this distinction, whether well or ill 
founded, does not affect the question before us, which is 
simply whether God causes all the actions of men ; and 
that he does this, Witsius fully believed, and plainly 
taught. What he says oi the subject of this distinction 
is merely his way of answering an objection, which we 
have answered in a different manner. It is, therefore, 
pmitted, as of no importance in this place, 



150 OBJECTIONS. 

searchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God, 
so far manifest themselves in his Providence, that 
it extendeth itself even to the first fall, and all 
other sins of angels and men, and that not by a 
bare permission, but such as has joined with it a 
most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise 
ordering and governing of them, in a manifold 
dispensation, to his own holy ends." Here, it is 
asserted that the Providence of God extends itself 
to every sin, and that by something more than a 
bare permission, that is, by a positive and power- 
ful agency, ordering and governing them. The 
same thing is asserted in the Catechism, Question 
li. " What are God's works of Providence ? Ans. 
God's works of Providence are his most holy, 
wise, and powerful, preserving and governing all 
his creatures, and all their actions." Here, God 
is said not only to preserve, but to govern, and to 
govern powerfully ; not only some of the actions 
of his creatures, but all their actions. And gov- 
erning, is not barely limiting and restraining, but 
ordering and directing. It is not merely causing 
things not to be done, but it is also causing things 
to be done. Thus, then, it is the professed doc- 
trine of all our church, that God, by his powerful 
agency, orders and directs all the actions of all 
his creatures. 

That the Westminster Assembly of Divines, 
who composed this Confession of Faith and Cate- 
chism, mean to be understood, in these passages, 



NEW DIVINITY. 



151 



10 assert that God causes all the actions of men 
by his powerful agency, will be more evident by 
consulting their other writings. Doctor Ticisse, 
who was Prolocutor of that Assembly, and who 
may, therefore, be considered as speaking their 
unanimous sentiment, says, "All things come to 
pass by the efficacious and irresistible will of 
God.' : * Again, 'It is impossible that any thing 
should be done, but that to which God impels the 
will of man." f Again. "God is the author (cause) 
of that action which is sinful, by his irresistible 
will."* 

Thus, then, it appears, that this doctrine is not 
new, but old divinity: that it was the doctrine of 
the Reformation, and has been the doctrine of all 
the orthodox from that time to the present 

* Vindicia?, b. iii. p. 19. The works of Twisse not be- 
ing at hand, these passages are given as they are quoted 
from him by another writer. 

t Vintiicia?. b. iii. p. 10. 

t Pars. b. iii. p. 2L Twisse also attempts to establish 
the same distinction which "Witsius, and other old divines 
make, between actions and their qualities: and to show 
rhnt God causes the one without causing the other. But 
they agree with us perfectly, as to the point supported in 
these discon rses, to \<i' ; that God, by his agency, causes 
all me actions of all his creatures. 



13 



SERMON IX 

EPHESIANS I. 11. 

Who worketh all things after the counsel of his 
own will, 

Having attended to the principal objections 
that are made against the doctrine supported in 
these discourses, what remains, is the 
IMPROVEMENT. 

And 1. If the doctrine we have supported is 
true, then God is a happy being. The happiness 
of God depends on his effecting what he desires 
and chooses. He desires and chooses with all 
his heart. And if his desires are not gratified, 
if his choice is counteracted, he is disappointed 
and unhappy. God is a being of infinite wisdom 
and goodness. He has formed his plan, in the 
wisest and best manner ; and he strongly desires 
the accomplishment of that which is wisest and 
best. But if he cannot carry his plan into execu- 
tion, if Satan and wicked men have it in their 
power to thwart his designs, and counteract all 
his wisest measures, he must be doomed to see 
himself perpetually disappointed, and consequent- 



INFERENCES, 153 

iy must be infinitely miserable. God is a being 
of infinite benevolence. He strongly and inva- 
riably desires the greatest good of the universe, 
and is continually engaged, with all his heart, in 
promoting it. And he strongly desires the good 
of every individual being, so far as it is consistent 
with the greatest good of the whole. But if the 
sin and misery that exist, are not for the greatest 
good of the whole, and come to pass contrary to 
his will, and in opposition to his strongest desires, 
can we conceive of a being more wretched than 
God must be, thus to see the fair fabric which he 
has made, so completely ruined, and Satan, the 
great enemy of God and man, triumphing in the 
eternal damnation of so many millions of those 
creatures which he had made for happiness and 
glory ! But if the doctrine we have supported is 
true, if God has decreed and causes whatsoever 
comes to pass, then we may infallibly conclude, 
that whatsoever comes to pass is wisest and best 
on the whole, and that God is infinitely happy, 
while engaged in promoting, without the possi- 
bility of disappointment, the highest felicity of the 
intelligent universe. 

2. If God worketh ail things after the coun- 
sel of his own will, then the saints will be happy 
when they get to heaven. The saints are benevo- 
lent beings. Their own personal interest, is not 
their chief object. They strongly desire the 
greatest good of the universe. And when they 



154 



INFERENCES. 



reach heaven, and take a view of the divine ad- 
ministration, in the light of eternity, if they see 
that the greatest good of the universe has nol 
been promoted, if they see that things might have 
been ordered better than they have been, that 
what was wisest and best has not taken place, it 
will mar all their joys, it will render them for 
ever unhappy. When they see their fellow crea- 
tures in the regions of despair, suffering the se- 
verest torments, and reflect, that they might have 
been saved, consistently with the general good, it 
will pierce their hearts with the keenest anguish. 
But if the doctrine we have supported is true, and 
God does decree and cause those things to take 
place, which are wisest and best; then, when the 
light of eternity shall enable the saints to see 
things as they are, they will perceive that the 
greatest good of the universe has been promoted ; 
they will perceive that the character of God is 
completely vindicated from all the aspersions of 
wicked men, and all his glorious perfections dis- 
played to the best advantage ; they will perceive 
that the greatest possible sum of good to intelli- 
gent beings has been secured, and they will be 
completely happy; their joy will rise to the high- 
est pitch, while they sing, "Alleluia, for the Lord 
God Omnipotent reigneth." 

3. If God worketh all things after the coun- 
sel of his own will, then the saints may trust in 
God now, and rejoice under all circumstances. 



INFERENCES. 15-5 

Tiie highest good of the universe will be secured. 
Nothing will take place, which is not, upon the 
whole, wisest and best. And though the good 
man may see many things taking place now, 
which are, according to his limited view of 
things, exceedingly undesirable, many things 
which appear to him adapted to dishonor God, 
and introduce misery and wretchedness among 
his creatures : let him trust in God. Let him be 
assured, that for some reason, though 10 him un- 
known, it is all wisest and best. When he sees 
iniquity prevail, and the enemy come in like a 
flood: when he sees evil men and seducers wax- 
ing worse and worse, deceiving and being de- 
ceived; when he sees infidelity take off her mask 
and blasphemy grow bold: let him trust in God. 
Let him be assured that his hand directs it all. 
Let him remember, that God will make the wrath 
of man to praise him, and the remainder of it he 
will restrain; that wicked men and devils are no 
more than his instruments, to accomplish the wis- 
est and best designs : that God never loses sight 
of his object, and can never mistake in the means 
he uses to promote it. Let the believer, then, 
trust in God, under all circumstances, and rejoice 
that the Lord reigns. Let him now begin his 
song of triumph, and go on his way with gladness 
of heart. Let him hear and comply with the ex- 
hortation of the apostle, "Rejoice in the Lord ah 
way, and again I say, rejoice." 

13* 



.156 



INFERENCES. 



4. If God worketh all things after the coun- 
sel of his own will, then we have proper grounds 
for submission, under the trials to which we are 
called. The proper object of submission, is the 
will of God. The language of submission is, 
"Father, not my will, but thine be done.' 7 But 
many of our trials come upon us through the in- 
strumentality of wicked men. If God, then, does 
not cause, and has not decreed the wicked actions 
of men, so far from being our duty to submit to 
such trials, it is our duty not to submit. If God's 
will is opposed to them, our will ought to be op- 
posed to them likewise. But if God has decreed^ 
and does cause all the actions of wicked men, 
then, when they treat us with unkindness and in- 
justice, we ought to see the hand of God in it r 
and be patient and submissive to his will. David 
gives this as a proper reason for submission. 
When Shimei came out to curse him, as he fled 
from his son Absalom, he says, "Let him alone, 
and let him curse, for the Lord hath bidden him." 
He saw the hand of God in it, and exercised the 
most cordial resignation. And our Lord, in the 
view of his sufferings, of which wicked men were 
the instruments, says, "The cup which my Father 
hath given me, shall I not drink it?" Let us fol- 
low examples so worthy our imitation, and when 
wicked men add insult to injury, and curses to 
contempt, let us say with David, "Let them alone, 
and let 1 hem curse, for the Lord hath bidden them," 



INFERENCES. 



157 



5. If God worketh all things after the couiv 
sel of his own will, then let us feel our depend- 
ence, and realize our own nothingness. An inde- 
pendent spirit in a creature is a self-exalting spirit, 
This we all have by nature. We love to be inde- 
pendent. This feeling is intimately connected 
with our self-righteousness, our unbelief, and im- 
penitence. Did we rightly feel our dependence, 
and our guilt, we should be humble and penitent, 
willing to renounce our own righteousness, and 
put our trust entirely in the Lord Jesus Christ, 
But we are unwilling to believe that we are en- 
tirely dependent upon God. If we must grant 
that we are dependent on God for all our powers., 
yet we w 7 ill not grant that we are dependent on 
him for the exercise of them. And if we can do 
some things independently of God, we feel as if 
we had some ground for self-exaltation. If we 
can perform some good actions, of which God is 
not the cause, we may take all the credit of them 
to ourselves. But if we are dependent on God 
for all our actions, then boasting is excluded. If 
we do no more than God causes us to do, by his 
powerful agency, then it is God that maketh us to 
differ from our fellow creatures, and we have no 
cause to be puffed up when we imagine we are 
wiser or better than they. When we see others 
falling into gross and scandalous sins, and cover- 
ing themselves with contempt and infamy, let us 
remember, that if God willed, we should do even 



158 



INFERENCES, 



worse than they. Let us, therefore, be mindful 
of our dependence, and of our sinfulness ; let us 
feel our obligations to God for his distinguishing 
kindness to us, and let us walk humbly before 
him all our days. 

6. If God worketh all things after the counsel 
of his own will, then, "let him that thinketh he 
standeth, take heed lest he fall." You are de- 
pendent upon God. It is his hand that holds 
you up. It is his hand that casts you down. 
Therefore, "be not high minded, but fear." You 
see that it is sometimes the will of God that his 
professed children should fall in a most grievous 
manner. You do not stand in your own strength. 
Beware, lest you be lifted up with pride, and God 
take this means to humble you. Watch and pray, 
that you enter not into temptation. Be earnest in 
beseeching God to keep you by his almighty 
power. Look to Jesus for strength, and for grace 
to help in every time of need. Trust in him alone, 
and you shall be holden up. 

7. If God worketh all things after the counsel 
of his own will, then we may infer the existence 
of God from every thing Ave see. We cannot 
open our eyes, but proofs of the divine existence 
croud upon us, from every quarter. The sun 
rises, and sets. The moon wanes, and fills her 
horn. The planets maintain their course. The 
blazing comet takes his unknown flight "through 
the void immense," and returns at his appointed 



INFERENCES. 



159 



time. The seasons roll round, at their stated pe- 
riod. Seed time and harvest, and cold and heat, 
and summer and winter, and day and night, con- 
tinue to succeed each other, in grateful vicissitude. 
And all this, by the agency of God. And those 
events also, which appear to us but small and 
trivial, no less bespeak an almighty hand. The 
falling of a sparrow, the motion of a hair of our 
heads, the dancing atoms that play in the sun 
beams, afford equal evidence of the existence of 
God. Wherever we turn our eyes, we see all 
nature springing into life and motion. But the 
smallest motion of the smallest particle of matter, 
or the least action of the least animal or insect, 
no less requires the divine agency to cause it, than 
the motion of the sun in the firmament, or the stat- 
ed revolution of the earth. Hence. 

8. We see, that to deny the doctrine of the 
universal agency of God. amounts to a denial of 
the existence of God. For, if one thing may 
come to pass without the agency of God, then 
another may. And if some things may come 
to pass without the agency of God, then all 
things may come to pass without the agency 
of God. And if all things may come to pass 
without the agency of God, then we cannot infer 
the existence of God from any thing we see. And 
if we cannot infer the existence of God from any 
thing we see, we have no proof of the divine ex- 
istence, we have no reason to suppose that there 



160 



INFERENCES* 



is a God, Indeed, if we cannot infer the exist* 
ence of God from any thing we see, and there is 
no need of supposing that there is a God, in order 
io account for every thing we see, then it is un- 
philosophical, and contrary to all sound reason- 
ing, to suppose that there is a God. And thus, 
atheism is the only rational scheme we can adopt. 
Let those, then, who deny the doctrine we have 
supported, beware what they do. Their senti- 
ments lead directly to atheism. And if they pur- 
sue their own scheme, where it naturally leads 
them, they will yet become open and avowed 
atheists. Let them be exhorted, then, to examine 
the ground on which they stand, and retrace their 
steps, before it is too late. Let them renounce 
their errors, and without delay, embrace senti- 
ments more consistent with reason, more agreea- 
ble to scripture, and more honorable to God. 

9. If God worketh all things after the counsel 
of his own will, then there is no such thing in us 
as a moral taste, or principle of sin or holiness, 
distinct from voluntary exercise. It is supposed 
by some, that we have within us, by nature, an 
evil principle, or corrupt taste, which is distinct 
from voluntary exercise, and is the source or 
fountain whence all our sinful exercises proceed ; 
and that in regeneration, a good taste, or principle 
of grace, is implanted within us, which is the 
source of all our virtuous exercises. But if the 
doctrine we have supported is true, there is no 



INFERENCES. 



foundation for such a supposition. It is a maxim 
of good reasoning, not to assign more causes for 
an effect, than are sufficient to produce it. If one 
cause is sufficient to produce the effect, and doee 
operate and produce the effect, then no other cause 
can have any efficacy in producing it, that is, no- 
thing else can be a cause of that effect. There- 
fore, if God causes all our voluntary exercises, by 
his powerful agency, there can be no other cause 
of them, that is, there can be no good or evil prin- 
ciple or taste, which is the cause of them. Hav- 
ing created the human soul, with the natural pow- 
ers of perception, reason, conscience, memory, 
and will, "it was only requisite," says the cele- 
brated Witsius, "that God, by the continual influ- 
ence of his providence, should preserve these 
powers, and excite them to all and each of their 
acts." Nothing more is necessary, and therefore, 
according to all sound reasoning, nothing more is 
to be supposed. Indeed, those who hold to a 
principle or taste, are frequently inconsistent with 
themselves. For they often object to the doctrine 
of God's causing all our actions, that it makes 
men machines, by preventing their acting volun- 
tarily. Now, although this objection does not 
apply to our doctrine, as we have already seen, 
yet it is fatal to the taste scheme. For it is true, 
that without voluntary action, men cannot be 
praise or blame worthy. Now, if there is a sin- 
ful principle in us by nature, which makes us 



162 



INFERENCES, 



guilty and deserving of punishment, antecedently 
to all voluntary exercise, then sin consists in this 
sinful principle, and not in voluntary exercise. 
But if sin consists in a sinful principle, then it 
consists in something which is perfectly involun- 
tary. And if sin consists in something which is 
perfectly involuntary, then it is a dictate of com- 
mon sense, that there is nothing blame worthy in 
it, any more than there is in a fit of the palsy, or 
a pain in the head. If we can be sinful for pos- 
sessing evil qualities which are involuntary, and 
we have exercised no will in or about them, then 
a barren spot of ground is wicked, and thorns 
and thistles are verily guilty. But no man feels 
to blame, and no man is to blame, for that which 
is perfectly involuntary. And to hold that we can 
be to blame for any thing involuntary, and yet 
bring this same objection against the doctrine of 
these discourses, is a contradiction. There is, 
therefore, no such thing as a principle of sin, or 
a principle of holiness ; there is no such thing as 
involuntary sin, or involuntary holiness ; but sin 
and holiness consist in voluntary exercise, and in 
nothing else. They consist entirely in supreme 
love to God, or supreme love to ourselves. 

10. If God worketh all things after the counsel 
of his own will, then sinners are as able to com- 
ply with the invitations of the gospel, as they are 
to reject them. They Lave no independent power 
to do either. But sinners have all the natural 



INFERENCES. 



163 



powers that the saints have. Men have the same 
natural faculties before as after regeneration. The 
sinner is no more, and no less dependent on God, 
than the saint. If it is proper to say, that the 
sinner is able to reject the offers of salvation, it is 
equally proper to say, that he is able to accept 
them. If he is able to go on in his sins, he is 
equally able to break off his sins, and turn to 
God. He has no power, in either case, but a de- 
pendent power. It is God that works in him to 
will and to do, in both cases. The truth is, sin- 
ners are as able to do all that God requires of 
them, as they are to do the contrary. They plead 
no want of ability to go on in their sins, because 
it is their own chosen way; and they would find 
no more want of ability to go in the way of holi- 
ness, if that was the choice of their hearts. It 
requires the same natural powers to love, as it does 
to hate an object; and it requires no others. Sin- 
ners have all these natural powers. And it is as 
easy to exercise these powers in loving God, as it 
is in loving sin : as easy to exercise them in obey- 
ing the divine commands, as in violating those 
commands. Hence, 

11. We see that it is proper to exhort and 
command sinners to repent and believe the gospel. 
If sinners were willing to comply with the gospel 
terms, but could not, there would be no propriety 
in exhorting them to do so. It would be but 
mocking his misery, to throw a rope to a drowu- 
14 



164 



INFERENCES. 



ing man, and exhort him to take hold of it, when 
he had no hands. But if sinners have all the 
powers that are necessary to comply with the gos- 
pel offer, and are only wanting in a disposition : 
if they can, but will not, then it is proper to ex- 
hort them, and command them, and entreat them, 
to forsake their sins and turn to God. There is 
a propriety in expostulating with them, as God 
does, "Turn ye, turn ye ; why will ye die?" 

12. If God worketh all things after the coun- 
sel of his own will, then there is encouragement 
for us to use means with sinners, for their salva- 
tion. Notwithstanding sinners are able to comply 
with the invitations of the gospel, they uniformly 
refuse. Notwithstanding all the joys of heaven 
are set before them, to allure them ; notwithstand- 
ing hell is uncovered before them, to terrify them, 
and the shrieks of the damned, as it were, vibrate 
on their ear; notwithstanding they are convinced 
of the necessity of immediate repentance; not- 
withstanding they are urged to escape for their 
lives ; notwithstanding the most moving expostu- 
lations are used with them, till they weep at their 
own folly; yet they still, as before, uniformly re- 
fuse. All our labor seems to be lost. All the 
arguments we can use, never induce them to take 
one step in the way to heaven The case of sin- 
ners would be utterly, hopeless, and all our exer- 
tions without any prospect of success, were it not 
for this truth, that God is a sovereign. He has 



\SYEU 'fc'N'C £S. 165 

the hearts of all men in his hand, and he can turn 
them as the rivers of water are turned. He has 
determined to save some, and he will save some, 
notwithstanding all their obstinacy. He can make 
them willing in the day of his power, and he will 
do so. He will save as many as it is best on the 
whole should be saved, as many as is consistent 
with the general good. And though he changes 
their hearts, and renews them by his holy spirit, 
yet he works by means. They are begotten by 
the word of •truth. This is the instrument, in 
God's hand. Here, then, is ground of encourage- 
ment for us to preach his word. And this is tho 
only ground of encouragement. It pleases God 
sometimes, to bless his word, and make it the 
means of convincing and converting sinners. And 
to be instrumental in saving one soul, would rich- 
ly compensate for a whole life spent in preaching 
the gospel 

143. 14 God worketh all things after the coun- 
sel of his own will, then this subject may afford 
us a good -criterion by which to judge of our own 
character. Are we pleased with this doctrine % 
Do we love to have God dispose of us, and of 
every -thiisg dear to us, both for time and eternity'? 
Are we willing to be in God's hands, and to let 
him do what he will with us ? Are we willing 
to be the clay, and let him be the potter, to mould 
us into such vessels as he pleases, and to put us 
to such use as he pleases ? Arc we willing to be 



166 



INFERENCES. 



made vessels of mercy or vessels of wrath, as 
God shall see most for his glory t Are we will- 
ing that God should determine whether we shall 
be among the number of the elect, or among the 
number of the reprobate? Do we desire the 
glory of God, so much more than our own per- 
sonal salvation, that if one of the two must be 
sacrificed, we choose it should be the latter ? 
Were the glory of God to be tarnished, as the 
price of our salvation, should we choose rather 
to be lost, than to be saved on such terms? When 
God says, Rom. 9. 18, that u he hath mercy on 
whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he 
hardeneth," are we willing he should do so with 
us ? When he says to Pharaoh, Exodus 9. 15, 
" Thou shalt be eut off from the earth: And in 
very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for 
to show in thee my power, and that my name 
may be declared throughout all the earth," that is, 
that he had raised him up to be glorified in his 
destruction, are we willing he should treat us as 
he did Pharaoh ? When we are uncertain how 
God will dispose of us for eternity, do we sa}^ 
with David, II Sam. 15. 26, "But if he thus say, 
I have no delight in thee: behold, here am I, let 
him do to me as seemeth good unto him" ? Or, 
do we value our own personal interest supremely, 
and desire that every thing else should be sacri- 
ficed to promote it? Are we unwilling to be in 
God's hands, and to let him determine our final 



Inferences 



state, as the good of the universe shall require I 
Would we "lain rlee out of bis hand" ? Do we 
feel our hearts rise against ihe sovereignty ot 
God I And does the idea of our being sacrificed 
to promote the glory of God. rill us with ragi ! 
When we' hear God say. Pro v. 16. 4. that be 
kk hath made all things for himself: yea, even tke 
tricked f os the day of evil ' : that some men ar 
"as natural brut? blasts, made to ' ' : ■ - i an . 
strove],"' II Pet. 2. 12, and tint h .• will *->eiiJ" 
some ''strong delusion, that they shoul ! believe a 
lie, that they might be damned." II Thess. -2 I i. 
1*2, and that of others, "he hath blin h I their -:y . 
and hardened their heart, that they should not se .■: 
with their eyes, nor understand wiih their beaif, 
and be converted, and I should Leal there.' John 
12. 40 — When we hear him say these things, and 
know not but we are the pe:s:ns spoken of, how 
do we feel ? Do we feel our proud hearts rise ha 
opposition ? Do we hate such a being as this 1 
By this we may be assisted in judging what is oe r 
real character. If we are the friends of God. w$ 
shall love to place him on the throne, we shah 
love to have him reiern. and wt shall loot e hare 
him dispose of us. But if we have not mis dis- 
position, if we do not feel willing to submit uncon- 
ditionally to his will, if we do not love an elect- 
ing and reprobating Sovereign, we have reason to 
conclude that we are the enemies of God, and thai 
we have no part nor let in his holy kingdom. Do* 



168 



INFERENCES 



you excuse yourselves by saying, as some do, that 
these doctrines are not true, and that the character 
exhibited is not the character of God, but of Sa- 
tan, and that therefore you are not bound to love, 
but to hate it ? Take heed what you do. Take 
heed how you blaspheme the God of heaven. He 
that reproacheth God, let him answer it. If you 
hate and oppose this God, and cease not to blas- 
pheme his name, and he proves, at last, to be the 
true God, what becomes of you? what character 
belongs to you? and whose children do you prove 
yourselves 1 

Finally. If God worketh all things after the 
counsel of his own will, then impenitent sinners 
have cause to tremble. You are in the hands of 
God. You cannot get out of his hands. He 
will work in you to will and to do, that which he 
pleases ; and he will dispose of you at last, just as 
he pleases. The glory of his great name, and 
the good of the universe, require that there should 
be some vessels of wrath, as well as some vessels 
of mercy. To promote the greatest good of the 
whole, it is necessary that some should suffer the 
vengeance of eternal fire, and that they should be 
such characters as will render it proper and fit 
that they should be sent to hell. Perhaps you 
are of that number. You are now of that charac- 
ter, if you are impenitent sinners. And there is 
reason to fear that you will continue of that char- 
acter. You will continue of that character, un- 



INFERENCES 



169 



less God shall change your hearts. And what 
reason have you to expect he will do this ? The 
general good requires that some should continue 
of that character, and go away into everlasting 
punishment: and are not you as likely to be the 
persons as any ? Are you not more likely, since 
you are already, in a great measure, fitted for de- 
struction ? And if God intended to save you, why 
has he not brought you to repentance before now ] 
If you are of that number, wo is unto you ! God 
will continue you no longer in this world, than 
till you have completely filled up the measure of 
your iniquities, and then he will cut you off, and 
send you to the regions of despair. Your anger 
and malice, your rebellion and resistance, will be 
of no avail. Though you rage and strive as 
much as you will, it will profit you nothing. 
Though you add to your own, all the malice and 
all the cunning of the infernal spirits, you will 
never be able to devise any thing which God will 
not turn to his own glory, and your everlasting 
disgrace and confusion. God will make use of 
you, as his instruments, to accomplish his wise 
and holy purposes : and when he has done his 
work with you here, he will put you to the only 
us? for which you are fit, and dispose of you just 
as we do of a worn out instrument, that is good 
for nothing but to burn. And while you lie and 
agonize in the flames of hell, your very curses 
and blasphemies shall be made to speak hm 



170 



INFERENCES. 



praise. And while the smoke of your torment 
ascendeth up forever and ever, the angelic hosts, 
and ransomed sinners, beholding the glorious per- 
fections of God displayed in your condemnation, 
will sing, "Alleluia, for the Lord God Omnipotent 
reignetlv' Amkn, 



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